




Every day, people are helped or allowed to die. Respirators are disconnect-
ed, life-saving operations are not performed, and doctors and nurses stand by
doing nothing as patients in distress die under Do-Not-Resuscitate ("DNR")
orders. These practices are routine in modern hospitals. Indeed, one study of
all cardiopulmonary arrests that occurred while in the hospital found that 75%
of the patients were allowed to die because they were under a DNR order.'
Another study found that 39% of all deaths in intensive care units were preceded
by DNR orders.2 Today you almost need someone else's permission to die.
Polls show that most Americans would not want to be kept alive if there
were no hope of recovery.3 To meet the public's desire for an earlier death,
states have rushed to enact right-to-die statutes and to put living wills, medical
durable powers of attorney, and advance directives on a stronger legal footing.'
Although living wills and powers of attorney could theoretically be used to insist
that all heroic efforts be made to preserve life, the assumption of the legislators
who propose them, the hospitals that market them, and the patients who execute
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them is that they will facilitate death-an early death rather than the degraded
life that the state or a hospital might impose on them.
Even the right-to-die statutes typically operate only when the patient or
someone acting for the patient has spoken. Somewhat reluctantly and with much
handwringing, most courts have been willing to enforce the wishes of terminally
ill patients, as long as those wishes are sufficiently clearly expressed. But if they
are not clearly expressed, some courts, especially recently,5 have mandated that
the patients be kept alive. In other words, the default rule applied by many
courts and medical ethicists is life aggressively pursued by medical treatment,
even if ultimately treatment is usually withdrawn.
Yet if most people would not want to be kept alive with high technology,
why do we require proof that they want what most people want? Why not
require proof that they're different than most people, that they would want to
be kept alive on life-support? If the patient's wishes are unknown, follow the
course that most people would want for themselves in desperate end-of-life
situations-a withdrawal of treatment to allow an earlier death.
In this Article, I examine the default rule of life under the usual standards
and justifications for default rules in law and economics. I argue that the default
rule in end-of-life situations should be death rather than life. Usually, a default
rule is the rule the party would have chosen if she could speak. Here it usually
isn't. Or it promotes efficiency in the form of wealth maximization. Here, it
doesn't. Or it promotes efficiency in the form of happiness, welfare, or general
utility. If people are the best judges of their own happiness or utility, once again,
it doesn't. Under these standards, life as the default rule in end-of-life situations




A. Medical Default Rule
The default rule as presented by most medical ethicists is life. As Ezekiel
Emanuael explains:
[F]rom medical school on, from their mentors' and their patients' expectations, their
instincts are well trained to intervene to prolong life. Indeed, physicians are rarely
challenged for intervening but often criticized for "going slow." "Physicians do not
easily accept the conception that it may be best to do less, not more, for a patient.
5. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Westchester County Medical
Center on behalf of O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y.2d 1988); Bernard Lo & Robert Steinbrook, Beyond
the Cruzan Case: The U.S. Supreme Court and Medical Practice, 114 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 895 (1991)
("The decision [in Cruzan] also has potentially harmful consequences. It may undermine family decision
making, encourage cynicism and disregard of the law, and promote defensive medicine."); see also
discussion at text accompanying notes 34-62.
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The decision to pull back is much more difficult to make than the decision to push
ahead with aggressive support." Whether it is positively affirmed, liberally espoused,
or instinctively assumed, prolonging life becomes the "default" response for physicians
facing clinical decisions without clear guidelines on terminating care. As a result,
aggressive treatment, without concern for the "whole" patient-the physicalization of
medicine-is the standard of care.6
Note that Emanuel even conceptualizes the rule as a "default" response. In one
standard medical ethics textbook, Medical Ethics, Jack Siebe also expresses the
rule in terms of default:
DEFAULT MODE
If there is no choice of care statement or the patient is not competent, the
physician's safest course of action is to assume that the patient wants all available
treatments to preserve life, unless it can be documented otherwise.7
In Ethics at the Edges of Life, Paul Ramsey argues for a doctor's "undimin-
ished obligation first of all to sustain life."8 Ramsey believes that doctors should
ask only which treatments are medically beneficial, not "whether patients' lives
are beneficial to them."9
In one medical ethics text, a chapter authored by two medical school
professors and a social worker concludes that feeding and hydration are
mandatory where the patient's life would be prolonged and the patient hasn't
expressed contrary wishes:
Therefore, in applying these two forms of therapy [hydration and feeding], two
critical questions to ask in the decision-making process are these: (1) Will therapy
effectively palliate the patient? (2) Will survival be prolonged? If the answer to
either of these questions is in the affirmative and the patient has not expressed wishes
to the contrary at some other time, then these therapies are mandatory."
The odd logic of their approach can be seen in the following passage, expanding
their view:
Intravenous fluids and alimentation prolong survival. There is no reason from a
medical point of view not to provide this therapy. Failure to recommend or institute
this therapy in the patient who has not expressed wishes to the contrary is a quality
of life decision.
6. EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE 91 (1991) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
7. Jack C. Siebe, The Patient's Choice of Care: Suggested Hospital Policies, in MEDICAL ETHICS
418 (John F. Monagle & David C. Thomasma eds., 1988).
8. PAUL RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE 165 (1978) (referring to "prognosis of fatal
illness, severe uncorrectable defect, incurability, or nonrecovery" in unconscious patients not yet
"dying").
9. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 157 (3rd
ed. 1989) (discussing Ramsey).
10. Kenneth C. Micetich et al., Intravenous Fluid and Nutritional Therapies and the Chronically Ill
Patient, in MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 7, at 180.
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Quality-of-life modifications of the medical recommendation are proper when it
is the patient who is making them. Those who provide care for these patients should
speak with them frequently and work with them so that when a critical event occurs,
a plan which is based on patient wishes and preferences has already been made. The
concept of a living will helps remind all of us to do this. But in the absence of such
prior directives, the patient must be treated. Thus, these patients should be
nutritionally supported and hydrated. When these patients develop acute, reversible
medical or surgical illnesses, in the absence of patient wishes to the contrary, there
is no medical reason not to treat."
Although these health-care professionals are obviously earnest, decent
people, I find their paternalism chilling. They conflate prolonging life with
maximizing patient welfare. They suggest treating patients when they wouldn't
want to be treated. Indeed, on the same page they admit:
[F]rom our own life experiences and from talking to our patients and their families,
we know that most people would not want to be bedridden, be force-fed artificially,
or be unable to care for themselves. Yet, we feel uncomfortable making a quality
of life decision for others. It is proper that the medical profession should refrain
from making these types of decisions. 2
They fall back on their own default rule-medical care when it prolongs
life--unless patients have left living wills or other advance directives. Yet quality-
of-life decisions are unavoidable in any event. Someone must decide either that
life is worth living or that it isn't. Their approach not only makes a quality-of-
life decision for patients-even a desperate life is of good enough quality to be
kept alive-but it also makes a quality-of-life decision that neither patients nor
families would want.
B. Legal Default Rules
End-of-life decisions may be every-day decisions, but they're not routine
when the law gets involved.13 There are almost as many appellate approaches
to withdrawing life-sustaining treatment as there are appellate cases. 4 But
some generalizations are possible. When people are competent, their treatment
decisions are almost always followed. 5 This reflects the philosophical principle
11. Id. at 181-82 (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 182.
13. One study found that in pediatric treatment withdrawals, the hospital's bioethics committee
seldom got involved. Larry S. Jefferson et al., Use of the Natural Death Act in Pediatric Patients, 19
CRITICAL CARE MED. 901 (1991).
14. Indeed, the Conroy court uses three tests: a subjective test, a limited-objective test, and a pure-
objective test. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
15. United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965). One exception is when children
are involved and a good outcome will probably result from treatment: then courts frequently override
parents who want to withhold treatment or to try quack remedies. See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588
A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991) (lower court awarded custody of child to state to authorize the hospital to treat
the child).
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of autonomy, the old common law doctrine of consent, the newer doctrine of
informed consent, individual liberty, and the constitutional right of privacy. 6
When patients, however, are incompetent, demented, partially conscious, or
unconscious, they must rely on others to follow their wishes. When those wishes
were expressed clearly in a written directive, such as a living will, again they are
usually followed. When those wishes were expressed ambiguously, or no wishes
were expressed, or the patient was never competent, then the wishes of others
become more important, sometimes paramount. TWo standards are most often
used-the substituted judgment standard and the best interests standard.
Under the substituted judgment approach, decisions are made by a family
member, guardian, agent, or proxy designated in a durable power of attorney or
other directive. 7 The proxy stands in the shoes of the patient and is supposed
to reflect what the patient would have wanted. 8 But in practice this approach
sometimes merges into the other main approach, the best interests standard. 9
As the Delaware Supreme Court put it confusingly, "This Court must therefore
substitute its own objective judgment to determine what is in [the patient's] 'best
interests."'2 Robert Veatch argues similarly, "In the limiting case where we
know nothing about the patient's [idiosyncratic] wishes, what could substituted
judgment mean other than doing what is most objectively determined to be in
the patient's interests?"2
Under the best interests standard, the condition of the patient and the
probable effectiveness of treatment are most important (though these are
certainly the chief factors considered by the patient or her proxy under other
approaches).22 Sometimes treatments that merely prolong life are treated as
beneficial;23 sometimes they aren't.24  There is some empirical evidence that
16. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.
1976); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (1986); see Kristine C. Karnezis, Annotation,
Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment Allegedly Necessary to Sustain Life, 93 A.L.R.3D 67 (1979); GERALD
DWORKIN, AUTONOMY (1989).
17. See, e.g., Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); In re
L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984).
18. See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021 (1983) (surrogate should be guided
by previously expressed desires of the patient); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980) (prospective
guardian's request granted to withdraw respirator and feeding tube honored because of patient's
previously expressed wishes); Kennedy Hospital v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) (under
substituted judgment rule, living will should usually be given effect).
19. Robert M. Veatch, An Ethical Framework for Terminal Care Decisions: A New Classification
of Patients, 32 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 665, 667 (1984).
20. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Del. 1991).
21. Veatch, supra note 19, at 667.
22. An ALR annotation summarizes the outcomes of many end-of-life cases:
[A] reading of the cases collected here suggests that a diagnosis that the patient is comatose,
semicomatose, or in a chronic vegetative state in conjunction with a prognosis of no reasonable
probability that the patient will attain cognitive functioning is likely to be regarded by the courts
as a sufficiently severe medical condition to order discontinuance of life-sustaining treatment.
John D. Hodson, Annotation, Judicial Power to Order Discontinuance of Life-Sustaining Treatment, 48
A.L.R. 4TH 67, 76 (1986).
23. In re Christine Busalacchi, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315 (1991) (state argued that treatment was
beneficial).
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relatives who try to guess what patients would choose for themselves do a better
job matching patient choices than relatives told to make their best recommenda-
tion. 5 This result supports a version of the substituted judgment approach that
actually tries to choose as patients would. Other approaches suggested by
commentators include following the wishes of the family.26
Theoretically, there are legal constraints on doctors who treat without
consent. Unconsented treatment is a battery and can give rise to a civil action
for damages. 27  In fact, however, someone brought to an emergency room
unconscious from the scene of an automobile accident will usually be treated
without consent.' The law reasonably assumes that most people would consent
to treatment in an emergency.29 If informed consent' is impossible, doctors
should get ordinary consent; that served the common law for centuries. If
neither informed consent nor simple consent is possible, then implied consent
must be used.31 Where even implied consent is lacking-that is, the patient
probably wouldn't consent if she were competent-in my opinion the doctor has
no right to treat. As the Massachusetts Supreme Court has argued, "The fact
that a person is incompetent should not result in the denial of that person's right
to be free from nonconsensual invasions of bodily integrity. 3 2  Inexplicably,
however, if the patient's right to refuse treatment is not expressed clearly, most
doctors and courts seem to think that doctors should have a right to treat even
where consent can't reasonably be implied.
The legal constraints often dissolve in practice. As the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research explains:
A number of constraints on the range of acceptable decisions about life-sustaining
treatment have been suggested. They are often presented in the form of dichotomies:
24. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 310 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 89 (1983).
25. Tom Tomlinson et al., An Empirical Study of Proxy Consent for Elderly Persons, 30
GERONTOLOGIST 54, 60 (1990).
26. See Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 375, 437-45 (1988); M.R.
Bliss, Resources, the Family and Voluntary Euthanasia, 40 BRIT. J. GEN. PRACTICE 117 (1990).
27. Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Banks v. Wittenberg, 266 N.W.2d 788,
791 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); Young v. Oakland General Hospital, 437 N.W.2d 321 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989);
SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE HOPELESSLY ILL PATIENT 23, 69 (1985).
28. Delahunt v. Finton, 221 N.W. 168 (Mich. 1928).
29. Id.
30. See Jeffrey S. Janofsky, Assessing Competency in the Elderly, 45 GERIATRICS 45 (Oct. 1990)
("The doctrine of informed consent requires that a patient understand the medical procedure being
proposed, that consent be voluntary, and that the patient be competent to give consent."). See also Tom
L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Informed Consent, in MEDICAL ETHICS 3-11 (Natalie Abrams &
Michael D. Buckner eds., 1983); Alexander M. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease
Research and Treatment, 123 U. PENN. L. REV. 340, 364 (1975); Note, Informed Consent and the Dying
Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1636-38 (1974).
31. See Banks v. Wittenberg, 266 N.W.2d 788 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); Delahunt v. Finton, 221 N.W.
168 (Mich. 1928); Young v. Oakland General Hospital, 437 N.W.2d 321 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
32. Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Mass. 1992); see also Matter of Moe, 432 N.E.2d
712, 718 (Mass. 1982).
[Vol. 56: No. 3
Page 185: Summer 1993]
an omission of treatment that causes death is acceptable whereas an action that
causes death is not; withholding treatment is acceptable whereas withdrawing existing
treatment is not; extraordinary treatment may be foregone but ordinary treatment
may not; a person is permitted to do something knowing that it will cause death but
may not aim to kill. The Commission has concluded that none of these dichotomies
should be used to prohibit choosing a course of conduct that falls within the societally
defined scope of ethical medical practice. Instead, the Commission has found that
a decision to forego treatment is ethically acceptable when it has been made by
suitably qualified decisionmakers who have found the risk of death to be justified in
light of all the circumstances. Furthermore, the Commission has found that nothing
in current law precludes ethically sound decisionmaking
Before the O'Connor34 and Cruzan35 cases of the last few years, in almost
all cases where the patient's current condition and medical prognosis were very
poor, the treatment was allowed to be withdrawn. 36 As the Missouri Supreme
Court stated in Cruzan, "Nearly unanimously, these courts have found a way to
allow persons wishing to die, or those who seek the death of a ward, to meet the
end sought., 37 On the other hand, many cases where the current condition and
medical prognosis were very good mandated treatment or chose the course likely
to lead to treatment.38  O'Connor and Cruzan39 raised a high evidentiary
standard, consolidating and expanding a line of earlier cases that included
Storar4° and Conroy.41
These four cases used the standard requirement that the patient's wish to
withdraw treatment must be "clear and convincing" to be given effect. Other
cases using this high evidentiary standard include Jobes,42  Gardner,43
Longeway,4 Barry,45 McConnell,'6 and Leach.47  Yet why require that the
33. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 89
(1983). See Alan Meisel, Legal Myths About Terminating Life Support, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1497 (1991):
These [myths] ... are (1) anything that is not specifically permitted by law is prohibited; (2)
termination of life support is murder or suicide; (3) a patient must be terminally ill for life support
to be stopped; (4) it is permissible to terminate extraordinary treatments, but not ordinary ones;
(5) it is permissible to withhold treatment, but once started, it must be continued; (6) stopping
tube feeding is legally different from stopping other treatments; (7) termination of life support
requires going to court; and (8) living wills are not legal.
34. In re Westchester County Medical Center on behalf of O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
35. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
36. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Mo. 1988).
37. Id.
38. See Karnezis, supra note 16, at 80.
39. Lo & Steinbrook, supra note 5, at 895 ("The decision [in Cruzan] also has potentially harmful
consequences. It may undermine family decision making, encourage cynicism and disregard of the law,
and promote defensive medicine.").
40. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
41. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
42. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 443 (N.J. 1987).
43. In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 953 (Me. 1987).
44. In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (I11. 1989).
45. In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1984).
46. McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecticut, 553 A.2d 596, 604 (Conn. 1989).
47. Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 426 N.E.2d 809, 815 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
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wishes be clear before a patient may be allowed to end treatment? Why not
require clear proof that the patient would want to continue treatment-for it's the
desire to continue treatment that's unusual?
In Storar8 the patient was seriously retarded. Because his wishes were
unknown and unknowable, treatment was continued.49 The court believed that
it would be improper for the court to substitute its own judgment for the
unascertainable wishes of the patient. Yet, of course, the court did substitute its
judgment.
In Conroy5° the wishes of the patient, her family, and her guardian to avoid
life-sustaining treatment were ignored because the patient's wishes were not
"clear and convincing." The patient was dying and was unable to move from a
semi-fetal position. Her leg was gangrenous up to the knee. She was "severely
demented" but interacted with her environment to a slight extent. For example,
she sometimes moaned when fed through her tube or when her bandages were
changed. Her nephew and guardian said that all his aunt "wanted was to ...
have [her] bills paid and die in [her] own house., 51 The patient feared and
avoided doctors and never was seen by one until she became incompetent. The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that hydration and feeding could not be
withdrawn (though the patient died during the litigation). And it set out an
elaborate procedure to be followed before treatment could be withdrawn in
other cases.52
In O'Connor the New York Court of Appeals upheld an order to insert a
nasogastric feeding tube into a 77-year-old woman rendered incompetent by
strokes. The patient's daughters, who were both practical nurses, opposed the
hospital's attempt to have the tube inserted. According to testimony by various
witnesses about conversations with the patient over many years, the patient had
stated that:
(1) she would not want to be a burden;
(2) she would not want to lose her dignity before she passed away;
(3) "nature should take its course";
(4) "artificial means" should not be used to prolong life;
(5) it is "monstrous" to keep someone alive by using machinery when
they're "not going to get better";
(6) people "suffering very badly" should be allowed to die;
(7) "if she became ill and was unable to care for herself she would not
want her life to be sustained artificially";
(8) "she would not want to go on living if she could not 'take care of
herself and make her own decisions '; and
48. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
49. Id. at 73.
50. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
51. Id. at 1218.
52. Id. at 1219-44.
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(9) she hoped that she would never have to be in a hospital again and
"would never want any sort of intervention[,] any sort of life support
systems to prolong her life."
53
The patient, however, had not specifically discussed removing food and water or
the possibility that withdrawing medical treatment might lead to a painful death.
The O'Connor court professed that a patient had the right to decline life-saving
medical treatment. But under these circumstances, the court held that the
evidence of the patient's desire not to prolong her life was not clear and
convincing.
The court claimed that it recognized a common-law right to refuse treatment,
but refused to honor O'Connor's own statements and the family's wishes to
withdraw treatment. The court held that the wishes of the patient were not
clearly expressed. And the court rejected the substituted judgment approach:
because it is inconsistent with our fundamental commitment to the notion that no
person or court should substitute its judgment as to what would be an acceptable
quality of life for another. Consequently, we adhere to the view that, despite its
pitfalls and inevitable uncertainties, the inquiry must always be narrowed to the
patient's expressed intent, with every effort made to minimize the opportunity for
error.
54
The odd reasoning here tracks that of the health care professionals." The New
York court suggests that no person or court should substitute judgment for the
patient, but the court is doing just that by substituting its own judgment. If
someone is going to substitute judgment for a patient, the family would usually
be a better surrogate decisionmaker than the state. To best preserve the
patient's own wishes and own conception of what quality of life suffices, we
should look to what the patient said or what that patient probably wanted. Any
other strategy substitutes the state's judgment for the patient's.
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the state's interest in
preserving life was paramount,56 at least where Nancy Cruzan's wish not to be
kept alive was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence
tended to show that Cruzan had seriously and repeatedly stated that she did not
want to be kept alive if she were a "vegetable" and that it was good that others
had died rather than lingered on in seriously impaired states:
(1) "Nancy said she would never want to live [in a vegetative state]
because if she couldn't be normal or even, you know, like half way, and
do things for yourself, because Nancy always did, that she didn't want to
live ... and we talked about it a lot";
(2) Cruzan said "several times" that "she wouldn't want to live that way
because if she was going to live, she wanted to be able to live, not to just
53. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 610-11.
54. Id. at 613 (citation omitted).
55. See supra part II.A.
56. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988).
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lay in a bed and not be able to move because you can't do anything for
yourself";
(3) Cruzan "said that she hoped that [all the] people in her family knew
that she wouldn't want to live [as a vegetable] because she knew it was
usually up to the family whether you lived that way or not";
(4) Cruzan "said that maybe it was part of a 'greater plan' that [a] baby
had been stillborn and did not have to face 'the possible life of mere
existence"';
(5) After her grandmother died, Cruzan said that "it was better for my
grandmother not to be kind of brought back and forth [by] medical
[treatment], brought back from a critical near point of death";
(6) According to Cruzan's sister, Cruzan's mother, and another of
Cruzan's friends, "Nancy would want to discontinue the hydration and
nutrition";
(7) Cruzan's sister said that "Nancy would be horrified at the state she
is in"; that Cruzan would "want to take that burden away from" her
family; and that based on "a lifetime of experience [I know Nancy's
wishes] are to discontinue the hydration and the nutrition"; and
(8) According to Cruzan's mother, "Nancy would not want to be like she
is now. [I]f it were me up there or [her sister] or any of us, she would be
doing for us what we are trying to do for her. I know she would,... as
her mother."57
But Nancy Cruzan's evidence was not formalized in a living will; thus it was
ignored. In upholding Missouri's decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that
this was something like the will requirement for passing property at death-wishes
are occasionally frustrated by a general rule requiring strict formalities.
Yet the analogy is inapposite. Will formalities are constantly criticized as
frustrating testators' intent;58 their formalism is considered anachronistic. But
more important, the default rule in wills is an intestate distribution scheme that
is designed to reflect what people do in wills. 9 In end-of-life decisions, the
default rule is the opposite of what would be chosen by the individual.
In Cruzan the United States Supreme Court affirmed Missouri's decision,'
holding that the U.S. Constitution didn't prohibit Missouri from imposing a high
standard of proof before honoring the right to die. As a matter of constitutional
law, I won't question the decision (at least in print). Whether the state has the
power to adopt perverse and stupid rules limiting the liberty of its citizens can't
be answered by direct reference to the language of the Constitution. One can
resort only to the intellectual swamp that the Supreme Court has created over
57. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-70, 321 (1990).
58. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance With the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1975).
59. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 91 (3rd ed.
1984); Mary L. Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate
Succession Laws in the United States, AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319 (1978).
60. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282-87.
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the last 200 years. I fear that if I start wandering around in that swamp, I would
fall in and sink. I might fall into a different hole than Rehnquist, O'Connor, and
Scalia did, but sink I surely would.
But the majority doesn't say that Missouri's rule is a stupid one that they feel
compelled to respect. On the contrary, they think it a good rule. Here they are
stepping onto turf that I do intend to explore. What default rule should a state
adopt when dealing with the hopelessly ill or unconscious?
In the Busalacchi case decided after Cruzan,61 the father and guardian of a
patient tried to move his daughter from Missouri (with its punitive laws) to
Minnesota with laws more favorable to withdrawing his daughter's feeding tube.
She had spent three years in a persistent vegetative state62 after an automobile
accident. The court ruled that the record was not sufficient to support moving
her to Minnesota. Treatment continued.
That most appellate decisions have nonetheless allowed death by one means
or another doesn't mean that the system is working. In almost all of these cases,
life was prolonged beyond the point most patients would want-at great cost and
poterntial damage to survivors with little or no corresponding benefit. If doctors
understood the default rule as death and families were informed of probable
patient preferences for death, the system might operate much more smoothly,
with less cost and agony over what the patient would have wanted.
III
DEFAULT RULES
The idea of default rules is one of the most powerful heuristics in the recent
law and economics and legal philosophy literature. In some form, the idea of
default rules has been with us for centuries. In the law of succession, for
example, when someone dies without a will, the estate passes by intestacy. The
general theory behind intestacy has long been considered the probable intent of
the decedent. The intestate distribution scheme is the default setting. Those
who want to avoid the default setting must make their desires clear in a will.
It is in contracts that the concept of default rules has achieved its highest
flowering. The use of contract default rules has been explored in a series of
articles and books by Ayres and Gertner;63 Baird; Barnett;65 Coleman,
61. In re Christine Busalacchi, 1991 Mo. App. Lexis 315 (Mo. App. 1991).
62. That was her diagnosis, but there was conflicting evidence on whether the diagnosis was correct.
63. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
64. Douglas G. Baird, Self-Interest and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
583 (1990).
65. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REv. 821 (1992).
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Heckathorn, and Maser;' Craswell;67 Easterbrook and Fischel;' Gillette;69
Goetz and Scott;7" Haddock, Macey, and Machesney;71 Johnston;72 Kull;73
and Schwartz.74
A default rule is a background rule that people may opt out of, a rule that
applies in the absence of a particular expressed preference. Thus when I suggest
that the default rule should be death in many end-of-life situations, I am not
trying to expand the types of medical conditions that can lead to the withdrawal
of treatment, nor am I asking doctors to do anything that they wouldn't do if
they had good evidence of the patient's wishes. Rather, I am asking them to
give the same treatment to those who can't speak as they give to those who can.
The two leading camps in default-rule analysis are the philosophical school
that seeks the intent of the parties,75 and the law and economics school that
seeks sound social policy in the form of wealth or utility maximization (which
may76 or may not77 seek the intent of the parties). My purpose here is not to
choose between these various sources for the content of decision rules; rather,
it is only to point out that, whichever of these sources is chosen, the default rule
ought to be death for at least some important classes of end-of-life situations.
Utility maximization, however, might lead to a different result in one case: if the
family wishes that the patient be kept alive when the patient would want
treatment withdrawn, intent analysis might point toward withdrawing treatment
while utility analysis might point toward keeping the patient alive because that
would make the family happier. I don't analyze the default rule under the
myriad of moral philosophies that are more absolute or content-directive than
liberty, efficiency, or utility approaches.
66. Jules L. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn & Steven M. Maser, A Bargaining Theory Approach
to Default Provisions in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 637 (1989).
67. Richard B. Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 489 (1989).
68. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCruRE OF CORPORATE
LAW (1991).
69. Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote
Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1990).
70. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261 (1985); Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
71. David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and
Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701 (1987).
72. Jason S. Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100
YALE L.J. 615 (1990).
73. Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43
HASTINGS L.. 1 (1991).
74. Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J.
353, 361 (1988).
75. See Barnett, supra note 65, at 821.
76. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 70, at 261; Schwartz, supra note 74, at 361; FRANK
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRucruRE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Jordan
v. Duff & Phelps, 815 F.2d 429,436 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.); id. at 446-67 (Posner, J., dissenting).
77. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 63, at 94.
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IV
WHAT PEOPLE WANT
Consent is the central organizing principle of the decision to undergo
medical treatment. In desperate end-of-life situations, courts shouldn't have the
power to order treatment when a person has not consented to treatment and
probably wouldn't if competent. If we were to model a legal default rule for
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment based on the wishes of the patient, we
should consider what patients in that situation would probably want and honor
those wishes as if actually expressed. Here there are two sources for determining
people's wishes for withholding treatment, besides what a particular individual
might have said or written before losing the power to communicate: opinion polls
and advance directives, such as living wills. Both point in the same direction.
A. Using Polls
1. Individual Preferences as Revealed in Polls. Medicine's ability to keep
patients more or less alive for years in a coma or persistent vegetative state has
robbed death of its certainty. Machines can provide food, hydration, and
respiration to those who would die without them. This greatly increases the
possibility that people can survive lengthy periods unconscious, semi-conscious,
or demented and deteriorating from terminal illnesses. People have responded
to this growing contact with degraded and lengthy deaths with a realization that
they don't want to go through this themselves.
I reviewed over 200 national opinion poll questions involving end-of-life
decisions.7" Most asked questions about the right to die, rather than the
treatment decision patients themselves would want. Only a handful asked
directly whether people themselves would want to be allowed to die. As the
following seven tables indicate, most people would not want to be kept alive if
they were on life support systems or in a coma.
Table 1
Preference for Withdrawing Life Support
If you, yourself, were on life support systems and there was no hope of
recovering, would you like to remain on the life support system or would you
like treatment withheld so that you could end your life?
Treatment Withheld 84%
Kept on Life Support 9
No opinion 7
SOURCE: GALLUP POLL, 1990
78. See Appendix for a selection of polls.
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Table 2
Preference for Withdrawing Feeding Tube
Suppose you were in a coma with no brain activity and were being kept alive by
a feeding tube. Would you want your doctor to remove the feeding tube and let
you die, or not?
Want removal of feeding tube 85%
Would not want tube removed 11
Don't know/No answer 4
SOURCE: CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES, 1990
Table 3
Preference for Withdrawing Food and Water
If you, yourself, were terminally ill or in irreversible coma, would you want life




SOURCE: GALLUP ORGANIZATION FOR THE AMA, 1990
Table 4
Preference for Stopping Treatment if Totally Dependent
How about if you had an illness that made you totally dependent on a family
member or other person for all of your care? (Repeat if necessary: Would you
tell your doctor to do everything possible to save your life, or would you tell
your doctor to stop treatment?)
Stop treatment 51%
Save life 31
It depends (volunteered) 7
Don't know 11
SOURCE: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES FOR THE TIMES MIRROR, 1990
Table 5
Preference for Stopping Treatment if in Great Pain
Now, I'm going to describe a few medical situations that sometimes happen, and
for each one, please tell me what you would want your own doctor to do, if you
could make the choice. If you had a disease with no hope of improvement and
you were suffering a great deal of physical pain, would you tell your doctor to
do everything possible to save your life, or would you tell your doctor to stop
treatment so you could die?
Stop treatment 59%
Save life 28
It depends (vol.) 6
Don't know 7
SOURCE: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES FOR THE TIMES MIRROR, 1990
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Table 6
Preference for Withdrawing Treatment if in Coma
Imagine you were in a coma with no hope of recovery, were suffering no pain,
and had left no instructions to your family or closest friend stating your wishes.
Would you want them to ask your doctor to withdraw life-sustaining treatment,
or would you not?
Yes, I would 75%
No, I would not 17
Something else (vol.) 2
Don't know 6
SOURCE: KRC COMMUNICATIONSIRESEARCH FOR THE KAISER FOUNDATION, 1991
Table 7
No Clear Preference if Disease Makes it Hard to Function
How about if you had a disease with no hope of improvement that made it hard
for you to function in your day-to-day activities? (Repeat if necessary: Would
you tell your doctor to do everything possible to save your life, or would you tell
your doctor to stop treatment?)
Stop treatment 44%
Save life 40
It depends (volunteered) 8
Don't know 8
SOURCE: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES FOR THE TIMES MIRROR, 1990
Only the last situation, "a disease with no hope of improvement that made it
hard for you to function in your day-to-day activities," received less than 50%
preference for withdrawing treatment. Even then, a plurality supported the
withdrawal of treatment. This last result is unclear primarily because the
question is unclear. To me, it covers not only a desperately ill helpless patient
(who might reasonably choose death) but also a fully competent, hard-working
degenerative arthritic (who finds it "hard to function in ... day-to-day
activities").
With this one (sound) exception, the polls show overwhelmingly that people
would not want to be kept alive on life-support systems (including food and
water) if they are terminally ill, in a coma, or in great pain. This result is
generally consistent with other polls. In his dissent in Cruzan,7 9 Justice Brennan
described two other polls:
A 1988 poll conducted by the American Medical Association found that 80% of
those surveyed favored withdrawal of life support systems from hopelessly ill or
irreversibly comatose patients if they or their families requested it. New York Times,
June 5, 1988, p. 14, col. 4 (citing American Medical News, June 3, 1988, p. 9, col. 1).
79. Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 312 n.11 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Another 1988 poll conducted by the Colorado University Graduate School of Public
Affairs showed that 85% of those questioned would not want to have their own lives
maintained with artificial nutrition and hydration if they became permanently
unconscious. The Coloradoan, Sept. 29, 1988, p. 1.'
Note the similarity in the numbers despite the differences in the questions. Six
of the nine polls mentioned so far favor withdrawing treatment in the range of
73-85%. There are dozens of other polls showing support for the right to die in
roughly the same range.8
For difficult policy decisions, it's often better to look at poll data or
treatment choices of those who have the most knowledge of the problem (such
as doctors) or those who have given it the most thought (such as the elderly or
nursing home residents). Tables 79-81 show physician preferences against
treatment for themselves.'
Table 79
Physician Preference Against CPR if Terminally Ill
Assume that you developed a terminal illness which has progressed and caused
your heart to stop beating. Given these circumstances, you would want CPR.
Strongly Agree, Agree,
or No Strong Feelings 14%
Strongly Disagree or Disagree 86
SOURCE: BRUNETTI, CARPEROS & WESTLUND STUDY, 1989
Table 80
Physician Preference Against CPR if
Mentally Incompetent and Terminally Ell
Assume that you are mentally incompetent suffering from a terminal illness
which has caused your heart to stop beating. Given these circumstances, you
would want CPR.
Strongly Agree, Agree,
or No Strong Feelings 7%
Strongly Disagree or Disagree 93
SOURCE: BRUNETTrI, CARPEROS & WESTLUND STUDY, 1989
80. Id. (citations omitted).
81. See, e.g., Appendix Tables 16-27.
82. Louis L. Brunetti et al., Physicians' Attitudes Towards Living Wills and Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation, 6 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 323, 327 (1991).
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Table 81
Physician Preference Against Feeding if Unconscious and in PVS
If you became permanently unconscious in a persistent vegetative state and could
not eat normally, you would want your life maintained through artificial feedings.
Strongly Agree, Agree,
or No Strong Feelings 8%
Strongly Disagree or Disagree 92
SOURCE: BRUNETTI, CARPEROS & WESTLUND STUDY, 1989
One study of the preferences of nursing home patients found that patients
had "clear and consistent patterns of preferences regarding the utilization of life-
sustaining treatment." Generally, participants "opted not to be treated. 83
Because the study weighted the strength of the responses, the exact numbers
preferring to withhold treatment can't be directly gleaned from the published
data. But the weighted averages supported the withdrawal of treatment from
nursing home residents in the following situations, no matter what the level of
cognitive functioning at time of treatment (intact, confused, or unconscious): tube
feeding (both temporary and permanent), resuscitation, amputation, and using
a respirator.'4 Interestingly, those who had had previous experience with life-
support treatment were less likely to want to be kept alive by life support.85
Another study86 of nursing home residents reached similar results:
Table 82
Competent Nursing Home Residents'
Preference Against Life-Sustaining Treatment
If you were about to die of natural causes, would you want us to keep you alive




SOURCE: DIAMOND, JERNIGAN, MOSELEY, MESSINA, & MCKEOWN STUDY, 1989
83. Jiska Cohen-Mansfield et al., The Decision to Execute a Durable Power of Attorney For Health
Care and Preferences Regarding the Utilization of Life-Sustaining Treatments in Nursing Home Residents,
151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 289 (1991).
84. Id. at 291-92.
85. Id. at 293 (59% would not want treatment, 8% would want treatment, 28% would not want
treatment if cognitive functioning impaired; differences with general population were apparently not
significant).
86. Eric L. Diamond et al., Decision-Making Ability and Advance Directive Preferences in Nursing
Home Patients and Proxies, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 622 (1989) (a study of 75 elderly nursing home patients
in Pitt County, North Carolina).
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One study of community-dwelling elderly persons directly examined the
influence of question framing on patient preferences.' It found that, by
framing questions about the treatment options in positive or negative terms, the
percentages preferring life-sustaining treatment could be manipulated. Yet, even
when the treatment options of CPR, ventilation, or nutrition and hydration were
described in positive terms, only 26.9-33.7% wanted treatment. Subjects
consistently preferred to have treatment withheld (CPR, ventilation, and
nutrition and hydration), no matter how the question was framed, if they would
later suffer from dementia (14.2-30.6% wanted treatment), persistent vegetative
state (13.6-33.7% wanted treatment), or stroke (8.5-26.9% wanted treatment).
A study' s of elderly patients found that the elderly preferred withholding
treatment in the following situations:
(1) Elderly persons would not want to have their pneumonia treated with
antibiotics if they were conscious, confused, lacked basic bathroom skills,
and were able to experience both pleasure and fear;
(2) Elderly persons would not want to be resuscitated if they were in a
coma from which they had a 50-50 chance of regaining consciousness and
had a heart attack, when if resuscitated there was a strong possibility that
they would never leave the hospital;
(3) Elderly persons would not want a pacemaker implanted if after a
patient arranged for an operation she had a stroke, leaving her partially
paralyzed, unable to feed or bathe herself, and mentally confused, where
the pacemaker would probably prolong her life for many years and
bankrupt her small estate;
(4) Elderly persons would not want an otherwise necessary blood
transfusion if they were very confused by a series of strokes, lacked basic
bathroom skills, and were able to enjoy their daily experiences but
became easily frightened.89
A study of people in a retirement community who already had living wills
revealed that if terminally ill they would not want CPR, a respirator, a
nasogastric feeding tube, or intravenous fluids.9  Retirees were ambivalent
about antibiotic therapy and would want oxygen for comfort.
87. Timothy R. Malloy et al., The Influence of Treatment Decisions on Advance Medical Directive
Decisions, 40 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOC'Y 1255 (1992).
88. Tomlinson et al., supra note 25.
89. Id. at 57, 61-64.
90. Martha Henderson, Beyond the Living Will, 30 GERONTOLOGIST 480, 482 (1990) (depending
on the treatment in question, responses ranged from 74.6% to 92.1% rejecting treatment).
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Table 83
Retirees' Preference If Terminally l
Yes Undecided or Qualified No
Want CPR 0% 22.2% 77.8%
Want respirator 0 7.9 92.1
Want nasogastric tube
feeding 1.6 9.5 88.9
Want intravenous fluids 6.3 19.1 74.6
Want oxygen for comfort 65.1 14.3 20.6
Want antibiotic therapy 23.8 34.9 41.3
SOURCE: HENDERSON STUDY, 1990
Another area of ambivalence is in the treatment of AIDS patients. One
study of AIDS patients found that they would want to be resuscitated. 91
Another study found that they would want to be hospitalized and treated for
pneumonia (95%), but opinions on ventilation (55%) and CPR (46%) were
mixed. 2  If the condition deteriorated to severe memory loss and severe
pneumonia, only 19% wanted ventilation and 17% wanted CPR.9
So far I have spoken only about withdrawing active treatment, not about
physician-assisted suicide by lethal injection or otherwise. This is more
controversial. In polls, a majority of persons favor physician-assisted suicide
where patients want it.
94
Table 57
Preference for Active Euthanasia, 1947-1991
When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should
be allowed by law to end the patient's life by some painless means if the patient
and his family request it?
1991 1990 1989 1988 1986 1985 1983 1982 1978 1977 1973 1947
Yes 70 69 66 66 66 64 63 61 58 60 53 37
No 25 26 30 29 31 33 33 34 38 36 40 54
Don't know 5 5 4 5 4 3 4 5 4 4 7 9
BY: NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER (1977-91); GALLUP ORGANIZATION (1947-73)
SOURCE: GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY (1977-91); GALLUP POLL (1947-73)
91. See Jennifer S. Haas et al., Discussion of Preferences for Life-Sustaining Care by Persons With
AIDS, 153 ARCHIV. INTERN. MED. 1241, 1245 (1993) (174 Boston patients want resuscitation; 113
patients don't).
92. Robert Steinbrook et al., Preferences of Homosexual Men With AIDS for Life-Sustaining
Treatment, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 457, 458 (1986).
93. Id.
94. See Appendix Tables 56-65.
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What is interesting about the dozen polls displayed in Table 57 is that there was
a reversal between 1947 and 1977 in public opinion polls about medically-assisted
suicide. In the 15 years since 1977, the consensus favoring suicide has grown
even stronger. Nonetheless, a proposal to allow this in Washington was narrowly
defeated in the November 1991 election,95 after a heated campaign. A
somewhat similar proposal to amend the California right-to-die statute to permit
physician-assisted suicide was defeated in November 1992.'
Nor do most people fear death.' Those who don't believe in an afterlife
have little to fear.98 Those over 50 fear death less,99 although they are closest
to death, have a higher mortality rate, and have had more of their life to think
about it. And most who believe in an afterlife think they have a good chance
of going to heaven.l °°
2. Problems with Polls. One must not be too sanguine about the data in Table
1 showing a desire to avoid treatment. First, even if most people wouldn't want
to be kept alive on life support systems, perhaps there are subgroups within the
population that feel differently-regular church-goers, Catholics, born-again
Christians, or older people. 1  Perhaps the state should have a different
presumption for them. In Table 8, I break down the data in Table 1, revealing
95. Initiative 119 was defeated 810,623 to 701,808. It would have granted "the right to death with
dignity through voluntary aid-in-dying if suffering from a terminal condition." This particular right would
be exercisable only if the patient executed an advance directive.
96. Suicide Aid Focus Turns to California, Los ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at A-3; Vote Totals
on Measures Were Wrong, Los ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 11, 1992, at B-1 (Proposition 161 defeated
5,381,128 to 4,529,829).
97. Gallup Poll, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY 52 (Jan. 1991) (poll conducted 1990) (23% fear death).
98. Id. (27% don't believe in life after death; 32% don't believe in Hell).
99. Id. (fear of death-age 50+ (16%), age 30-49 (25%), age 18-29 (33%)).
100. Id. (77% think that they have an excellent or good chance of going to heaven).
Although poll data show that neither those who believe in heaven, nor those who don't, fear
death, the reason that the nonreligious are unafraid of death is open to speculation. Leonardo Da Vinci
believed that "a life well spent brings happy death." Similar views were held by many Enlightenment
thinkers, including Condorcet, most pragmatists, and such philosophers as Bertrand Russell. On the
other hand, some philosophers, particularly existentialists, have urged that we cultivate an awareness of
death as a way to live a fuller life. See JACQUES CHORON, DEATH AND WESTERN THOUGHT (1963);
Robert G. Olson, Death, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 307, 308 (1967).
Among those philosophers expressing a fear of death are the Spanish existentialist, Miguel de
Unamuno: "As a youth and even as a child, I remained unmoved when shown the most moving pictures
of hell, for even then nothing appeared to me quite so horrible as nothingness itself." Robert G. Olson,
supra, at 308. Here, as elsewhere, it appears that existentialists think differently than the rest of us. Not
only are Americans unafraid of death, but they also don't think about it much. Gallup Poll, GALLUP
POLL MONTHLY 51 (Jan. 1991) (1990 poll) (7% think about it very often; 9% think about it somewhat
often).
101. On the religious arguments about dying, see THOMAS C. OGDEN, SHOULD TREATMENT BE
TERMINATED? 61-89 (1976); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, THE RIGHT TO DIE (1973); Isaac Franck &
Richard A. McCormick, Moral Dilemmas That are Acute Within a Religious Tradition: A Jewish
Perspective; A Catholic Perspective, 18 HosP. PRAC. 192 (1983); Gilbert Meilander, The Distinction
Between Killing and Allowing to Die, 37 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 467 (1976); Bernard Ramm, A Christian
Definition of Death, 25 J. AM. ScI. AFFILIATION 56, No. 2 (1973); Robert B. White & H. Tristram
Engelhardt, A Demand to Die: Case Studies in Bioethics, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 9, No. 3 (June
1975).
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even more clearly that Americans don't want to be kept alive on life support,
regardless of religion, age, sex, race, or fear of death.
Table 8
Preference for Withholding Treatment
Broken Down by Demographics
If you, yourself, were on life support systems and there was no hope of
recovering, would you like to remain on the life support system or would you




TOTAL: 9% 84% 7%
Age:
18-29 11 85 4
30-49 8 84 8
50 or older 9 82 9
Does getting older bother you?:
A great deal 17 70 14
Somewhat 9 87 5
Not at all 8 84 8
Fear of death:
Yes, fear death 11 83 6
No, don't fear death 8 84 8
Thinking about death:
Very often or somewhat often 7 5 8
Every now & again or
almost never 9 83 7
Religion:
Protestant 9 84 8
Catholic 8 85 7
Jew 9 91 0
None 10 80 11
Born-Again Christian:
Yes, born-again 9 84 7
No, not born-again 8 85 7
Church/Synagogue Member:
Yes, church/synagogue member 9 84 8
No, not c/s member 9 84 7
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Attended church in last 7 days:
Yes, attended church 10 82 9
No, didn't attend church 8 85 6
Sex:
Male 11 82 7
Female 7 85 8
Education:
College Graduate 9 82 9
Some College 10 83 7
High-School Graduate 9 86 5
Less Than H-S Graduate 7 82 12
Education by Sex:
College Male 13 79 8
College Female 6 86 8
Noncollege Male 9 85 6
Noncollege Female 8 85 7
Race:
White 7 87 6
Black 19 64 17
Other 25 71 5
Region:
East 14 78 8
Midwest 7 87 6
South 8 83 10
West 6 88 7
Income:
$50,000 + 8 89 3
$30,000-49,900 10 86 5
$20,000-29,900 5 86 9
Under $20,000 11 83 7
Political Party:
Republican 9 84 7
Democratic 11 82 7
Independent 7 86 8
Ideology:
Liberal 8 86 6
Moderate 6 91 3
Conservative 9 84 7
BY: GALLUP ORGANIZATION
SOURCE: GALLUP POLL, 1990 (demographic data previously unpublished)
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As Table 8 shows, there is little difference between various social, political, and
religious groups in their preferences for withholding treatment. Contrary to what
some people might expect, Catholics, born-again Christians, regular church-goers,
and older people aren't more likely than the general population to want to be
kept alive on life support systems. Of the 47 demographic groups broken down
in the poll, none had less than 64% preferring the withholding of life support or
more than 25% wanting to be kept alive. The smallest ratio preferring death was
nearly 3 to 1 (71% to 25% for nonwhites other than blacks); the largest ratio was
17 to 1.1" Only 3 subgroups had more than 14% desiring to be kept
alive-blacks (19%), other nonwhite races (25%), and those bothered a great deal
by getting older (17%). Only one subgroup (blacks-64%) had less than 70%
favoring the removal of life support. The results are remarkably consistent
across subgroups, so consistent that the small differences between subgroups may
be due to chance. Other studies have found similar results for the highly
religious; they are no different in their treatment preferences.0 3
A more profound concern with this polling data is the question itself. In
most polls, the responses that people give are highly dependent on how questions
are asked. The Malloy study, which examined the influence of question framing
on results, found significant differences when the treatments were presented
positively or negatively."°4 But the preference for withdrawing treatment was
strong regardless of how the question was framed.
The question in Tables 1 and 8 asked what people would want if there were
"no hope of recovering." It's true that doctors frequently know with substantial
certainty what will happen to a patient. For example, as of 1990, only 3 of
100,000 patients in a persistent vegetative state had ever regained conscious-
ness.105 Yet to say that there is no hope is to suggest a level of certainty that
will sometimes be beyond that achievable. But people answering polls are not
stupid. They operate within the same epistomological scheme we all do. They
are likely to interpret the phrase about "no hope" as reflecting a doctor's opinion
that there is no hope. It would be reasonable to assume that those answering the
poll were aware of the impossibility of absolute certainty about the future.
Nonetheless, it would obviously be better for policymakers to explore the
level of certainty needed about prognosis, as well as the degree of recovery or
good outcome possible. Regaining consciousness with serious brain damage is
certainly a possibility for many patients in extended comas, but would most
people count this as recovery? The strength of the public's preference for
withdrawing life-support suggests that this preference would probably persist as
the likelihood and degree of recovery rose, but it's unclear where it would cross
the 50% level for some subgroups.
102. 86% to 5% for incomes $20,000-29,900.
103. Cohen-Mansfield et al., supra note 83, at 293.
104. See Malloy et al., supra note 87.
105. Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 309 n.8 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
B. Individual Preferences as Revealed in Living Wills, Durable Powers of
Attorney for Health Care, and Other Medical Directives
Polls are only one way to reveal individual preferences-and not necessarily
the best. Indeed, in determining the proper rules for succession to property at
death, polls have proved to be notoriously unreliable. When people were asked
in a poll whether parents should be allowed to disinherit their minor children,
93% said no."06 Yet in Allison Dunham's study of will-making practices in
Illinois,"° he found that in every case in his sample with a surviving spouse and
minor children of that marriage, the testator did just that. He or she disinherited
the minor children in favor of the surviving parent. Of course, part of the
disjunction between the poll and practice is in the wording of the question.
People incorrectly assume that disinheriting a child is an act of spite different
from merely providing for them by leaving the property in the hands of the
child's father or mother.
Yet the lesson here is important. Looking at what people actually do when
planning their estate with an attorney may be more reliable than looking at what
they say to a pollster. Indeed, the insights of Dunham's work, that people in
their wills leave much more to their spouses than the old intestacy rules would
have provided, have slowly but effectively worked their way into the most recent
intestacy schemes. The intestacy share of the surviving spouse with minor
children has moved in the United States from the traditional quarter or third, to
more than half in the pre-1990 Uniform Probate Code," to the entire estate
in the latest revision of the Uniform Probate Code.
Several studies used actual directives or patients requested that the results of
the surveys be put in their charts."° Patient preferences for the withdrawal of
treatment were shown in each of these studies. In one study, discrepancies
between the treatment option on an advanced directive and their survey
treatment option were examined."I In all six cases of discrepancies, the patient
was more likely to want treatment withdrawn when the patient actually expected
the advance directive to be acted upon.'
1. Living Wills. Intestacy is the default rule for people who don't leave wills.
Although it has taken a long time, the default rule now in the Uniform Probate
Code looks like what people usually do when they write wills. What I am
suggesting in this article is similar-that the default rule for end-of-life situations
106. J. COHEN, R. ROBSON & A. BATES, PARENTAL AUTHORrrY: THE COMMUNITY AND THE LAW
76-78 (1958).
107. See Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30
U. CH. L. REV. 241, 256 (1963).
108. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-101 (1989); id. § 2-102 (1990).
109. See Cohen-Mansfield et al., supra note 83, at 289 (advance directives executed); Diamond et al.,
supra note 86, at 625 (same); Jefferson et al., supra note 13, at 901 (same); Henderson, supra note 90,
at 483 (80% wanted questionnaire to be part of medical record).
110. Diamond et al., supra note 86, at 625.
111. Id.
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should look like what people usually do when they write health care direc-
tives,112 particularly living wills113 and durable medical powers of attorney."t4
Since December 1, 1991, under the federal Patient Self-Determination Act,
hospitals and other facilities must inquire about advance directives when
admitting in-patients.11 5 They must record the existence of any directives in the
patients' charts.
In the 1984 edition of the casebook Wills, Estates, and Trusts, Jesse
Dukeminier and Stanley Johanson begin their brief discussion of living wills with
these words:
In recent years a document has been created called, rather perversely it seems to us,
a living will. It contains directives concerning termination of medical treatment, but
it possibly could be viewed as an advance disposition of a person's life. The
document provides that the signer's life shall not be artificially prolonged by
extraordinary measures where there is no reasonable expectation of recovery from
extreme physical or mental disability.'16
This passage is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it explains in part
why living wills are covered very little if at all in trusts and estates courses, even
though they sound like estate planning to clients." 7  Are they really so
different from guardianship provisions? Second, this passage describes what
these devices do-direct medical treatment. But the last sentence is the most
interesting for my purposes: "The document provides that the signer's life shall
112. See Kent W. Davidson et al., Physicians' Attitudes on Advance Directives, 262 JAMA 2415
(1989) (advance directives promote patient autonomy); Linda L. Emanuel, The Health Care Directive:
Learning How To Draft Advance Care Documents, 39 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1221 (1991) (model
directive contains "an instructional section, a durable power of attorney section, a values statement
section, and an organ donation section in addition to the illness scenarios section"); Linda L. Emanuel
& Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Medical Directive: A New Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261
JAMA 3288 (1989); Kenneth V. Iserson, Getting Advance Directives to the Public: A Role for Emergency
Medicine, 20 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 692 (1991) ("Only 9% of Americans have executed advance
directives."); Jan Hare & Carrie Nelson, Will Outpatients Complete Living Wills? A Comparison of Two
Interventions, 6 J. GENERAL INTERNAL MED. 41 (1991) (study of use of advance directives).
113. Note, Comparison of the Living Will Statutes of the Fifty States, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 105 (1988);
David J. Doukas et al., The Living Will: A National Survey, 23 FAM. MED. 354 (1991) (study of living
will practices); John A. Robertson, Second Thoughts on Living Wills, 21 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 6, No.
6 (1991). In 1990, there were 40 states (and the District of Columbia) with living wills laws. National
Legal Center Staff, Medical Treatment for Older Persons and Persons with Disabilities: 1990
Developments, 6 ISSUES LAW MED. 341 (1991).
114. Susan R. Martyn & Lynn Balshone Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the Terminally
Ill: The Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEBR. L. REv. 779 (1984); Jiska Cohen-Mansfield
et al., The Utilization Of The Durable Power Of Attorney For Health Care Among Hospitalized Elderly
Patients, 39 J. AM. GERIATRICS SoC'Y 1174 (1991).
115. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, §§ 4206 & 4751, Pub. L. No. 101-508 (1990);
Theresa Hudson, Hospitals Work to Provide Advance Directives Information, 65 HOSPITALS 26 (Feb. 5,
1991); Elizabeth McCloskey, Between Isolation and Intrusion: The Patient Self-Determination Act, 19
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 80 (1991).
116. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 59, at 283 (footnotes omitted).
117. The Health Care Group, Preparation for Incapacity Essential to Plan, 94 PA. MED. 40 (May
1991) ("Without .. . [a durable general power of attorney and a living will] your [estate] plan is not
complete.").
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not be artificially prolonged ... .""' Dukeminier and Johanson state the plain
truth. Although these living wills can theoretically be used to prolong life,
overwhelmingly these direct that life shall not be prolonged artificially. Indeed,
realistically, that's their purpose-to direct the withholding of treatment.
Almost all living wills direct the withholding of care, not the prolongation of
life.119 In one study, researchers compared elderly preferences (86%) for
withdrawing treatment in terminal illnesses with the state's living will statute and
found that they were consistent: "We conclude that living will legislation is
congruent with the desire of many elderly persons to limit medical care in
terminal illness."12 Other studies of attitudes toward living wills have similarly
concluded that most patients "opted to forego burdensome measures when death
appeared imminent.' '2
One criticism that might be raised against my analysis here is that, by making
a living will, a person is opting out of the default rule. Why base decisions on
people who opt out of the default rule rather than on those who agree with it
and do nothing? Yet a similar criticism was made of using the Dunham study
to remake the law of intestacy. And there this objection was ultimately rejected.
Perhaps policy makers thought that people who make wills are not so different
from other people, though they're certainly richer. Also, there are several
reasons that one might want to make a will besides opting out of the intestacy
scheme, such as choosing a guardian for your children, choosing an executor,
waiving the bond or surety, or reducing taxes.
Likewise, in end-of-life situations there are reasons for making a living will
that go beyond a decision to opt out of the default rule. First, the default rule
here is far more muddled than in intestacy. There is considerable confusion
about just what the default rule is among the general public. If your family or
the doctor decides to pull the plug, will the courts or the hospital hierarchy allow
it? This confusion arises in part because some courts and hospitals emphasize
what the patient wanted, while others use a substituted judgment model that
leaves the choice to the family or a guardian, while still others use a best
interests model (which may do what the state wants). All those models are
greatly affected by the prognosis. If a bad outcome is almost certain, most courts
have actually allowed treatment to be stopped. Thus, if you would want life
aggressively preserved but your family wouldn't, without a living will, you greatly
reduce your chances of receiving the benefits of the default rule. Further, many
people would want to relieve their family of the burden of choosing even if they
thought that the family would ultimately choose the same treatment that they
would.
118. See supra text accompanying note 116.
119. See supra notes 83-86, 90, 109 and accompanying text.
120. Elizabeth R. Gamble et al., Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior of Elderly Persons Regarding
Living Wills, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 277, 279 (1991).
121. Diamond et al., supra note 86.
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Perhaps a stronger argument against viewing those who opt out of the system
as grossly unrepresentative of the majority is that most people want living wills.
Stated another way, most people would want to opt out of the default rule at
least to the point of making a living will. About 4 to 24% of Americans have
a living will.t22 According to a Gallup Poll, among the approximately 80% who
don't, 75% want one.1" Thus about 80% of the population have a living will
or want one; only about 14% don't want one.124 Unless those who want a
living will look completely different from those who have one (and there's some
evidence that they're similar"2 ) a great majority of the population either has
or would like to have a living will that provided for withholding treatment in at
least some significant situations.
2. Durable Powers of Attorney for Health Care and Other Advance Directives.
Living wills are falling out of favor in the academic community. There are two
related reasons: Living wills can't foresee all of the possible situations that might
arise, and living wills typically are too narrow to cover many of the easily
foreseeable situations.26 Durable powers of attorney for health care are
another means of resolving treatment problems in end-of-life situations. Some
commentators prefer living wills; others prefer durable medical powers of
attorney; others prefer hybrid medical directives. 27 For safety, I think that
people should have the hybrid medical directive or both of the other directives.
Living wills state the patient's wish to withhold treatment. Powers of
attorney are formalized agency relationships appointing another person, an agent
or attorney-in-fact (who is not usually a lawyer), to make decisions for them.
These may be limited to particular duties or decisions (for example, medical
decisions or investment decisions) or they may be general. An ordinary power
of attorney ceases at death or incompetency, like most agency relationships. To
fill this void, all fifty states have enacted legislation allowing individuals to
execute durable powers of attorney, which continue into incompetency but cease
122. See Tables 66-70 in Appendix (15-24% have living wills); Dallas M. High, Howard B. Turner,
Are Kentuckians Using Advance Medical Directives?, 89 J. KY. MED. ASS'N 546 (1991) (9% of
Kentuckians have living wills; 9% have durable powers for health care); Iserson, supra note 112, at 692
("Only 9% of Americans have executed advance directives."); Allen S. Joseph & Charles E. Grenier,
The Right to Die: Public Perceptions and Attitudes in Metropolitan Baton Rouge, 142 J. LA. STATE MED.
Soc'Y 18 (Nov. 1990) (less than 4% have executed living wills).
123. Gallup Poll, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY 56 (Jan. 1991) (1990 poll) ("If you don't have a living
will, would you like to have one?"-Yes (75%), No (17%), No Opinion (8%)).
124. Id.
125. Roberta Ann Smith et al., Measuring Desire for Control of Health Care Processes, 47 J.
PERSONAL SOC. PSYCH. 415, 422 n.6 (1984) (both groups similar); Cohen-Mansfield et al., supra note
83, at 292 (Those executing durable powers during the study were more likely to want treatment stopped,
but both groups wanted treatment stopped.).
126. Lawrence L. Heintz, Legislative Hazard: Keeping Patients Living, Against Their Wills, 14 J. MED.
ETHICS 82 (1988); Alan E. Lazaroff & William F. Orr, Living Wills and Other Advance Directives, 2:4
CLINICS IN GERIATRIC MED. 521 (1986).
127. L. Emanuel, supra note 112; see Henderson, supra note 90.
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at death.1" More recently, planners have been encouraging clients to use
durable powers of attorney limited to health care.129 These have the advantage
of covering any possible situation, not just those situations that may be covered
by living wills. But some courts may not be willing to abide by the decision of
an agent to withhold treatment without good evidence that such a treatment
option would have been preferred by the patient. So cautious planners advise
their clients to have both living wills and medical durable powers of attorney."3
Other sorts of advance medical directives may combine the proxy designation
of the power of attorney with the treatment wishes of the living will. For
example, one model medical directive contains "an instructional section, a
durable power of attorney section, a values statement section, and an organ
donation section in addition to the illness scenarios section. ' ' 131  Such a
directive serves the functions of both living wills and durable powers of attorney.
Medical directives may specify how the agent's medical discretion should be
exercised. In Illinois, patients usually choose the option that allows the
withdrawal of treatment.132 This is not surprising. Medical durable powers and
medical directives have two main goals: (1) to reduce litigation, confusion, and
pain by designating a decision-maker; and (2) to facilitate the withdrawal of




Thus far I have examined the default rule of life, assuming that an individual
has the right to control his medical treatment and that medical treatment should
be based on the actual or probable consent of the patient. This is the prevailing
principle that is professed (but not always followed) by the medical profession
and the courts. It is also the principle that is most consistent with liberalism,
libertarianism, and the liberal democracratic form of government that we have
in the United States. It is not necessarily the result that would obtain under
philosophies that are more morally deterministic or paternalistic.
128. According to Justice O'Connor in Cruzan, "All 50 states and the District of Columbia have
general durable power of attorney statutes." The statutes are cited there. Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 290 n.3 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. Cohen-Mansfield et al., supra note 83, at 1174 (discussing study of use of medical powers; most
patients chose their closest relative); Mary Kane Goldstein et al., Durable Power Of Attorney For Health
Care: Are We Ready For It?, 155 WESTERN J. MED. 263 (1991) (study of durable power of attorneys in
Veterans Affairs hospitals).
130. In 1990, 19 states (and the District of Columbia) had laws providing for durable power of
attorney for health care. National Legal Center Staff, supra note 113, at 341. According to the Cruzan
decision, in 1990 at least 13 states (and D.C.) had "durable power of attorney statutes expressly
authorizing the appointment of proxies for making health care decisions." See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 290
n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In addition, in 1990 13 states "ha[d] living will statutes authorizing the
appointment of healthcare proxies." Id. at 291 n.4.
131. See Emanuel, supra note 112; Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 112.
132. See supra notes 83-86, 90, 109 and accompanying text.
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In this part, I examine the results that would obtain under various strains of
law and economics. Actually, from my discussions with law and ecomomics
scholars, their approaches would be very similar to the analysis I have already
engaged in. First, some assume that efficiency concerns come into play only
after basic property and autonomy rights are established. The right to control
one's body would be a prior right established by a positive legal system or
recognized as a natural right. Law and ecomomics would then come into play
only to analyze how the right to control treatment could be most efficiently
carried out.
A second law and economics approach would establish the right to physical
autonomy as an efficient legal rule.133 The default rule of death would then
follow from the right to autonomy. Law and economics could be used to show
that autonomy was efficient without assuming autonomy as a first principle.
Particular default rules need not be open to challenge as inefficient so long as
they follow from the autonomy right, which is efficient. This approach is in
essence a form of rule-utilitarianism.
Most economists would take one of the two approaches already mentioned.
Both approaches would more or less recapitulate the analysis in the last part.
Economists would, however, be less interested in polls than in medical directives
expected to be acted on. Economists are more interested in behavior with
consequences than in nonbinding preferences.
The third approach of law and economics scholars would be to assess the
default rule of life or death without the intervening individual right to control
treatment. The default rule would be assessed according to its efficiency under
wealth, welfare, or utility maximization. The rest of this part examines the
default rule in end-of-life situations under this third approach, trying to derive
the default rule directly from efficiency concerns. My analysis is complex enough
that, although I sometimes distinguish between wealth, welfare, and utility
maximization, I usually don't distinguish them as fully or carefully as I would in
a much longer treatment.
A. Wealth Maximization
1. Allowing Unproductive People To Die
Conventional (neoclassical) law and economics treats wealth maximization
as the main goal of legal rules.1" Usually distributive issues are ignored, as
long as the pie grows larger.131 In medicine, however, even taking economics
133. See, e.g., Lloyd Cohen, A Justification of Social Wealth Maximization as a Rights-Based Ethical
Theory, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411 (1987).
134. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1982); Richard A. Posner,
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979); Gary Lawson, Efficiency and
Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53 (1992).
135. Richard W. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility: Unscientific
Formalism and False Semantics, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 562, 563 (1987). See also Ronald Dworkin, Why
Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1984).
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
explicitly into account is often rejected. As one panel report concluded: "There
is currently no policy available on the national, local, or institutional levels that
would ethically justify the use of economic considerations in decisions concerning
life-sustaining treatment."'136 The same report goes on "to shun invidious
comparisons of the economic value of various individuals to society, and to
refuse to abandon patients and hasten death to save money.""
Only rarely do end-of-life cases treat wealth explicitly. When they do, it's
usually to point out that allowing the patient to die will not cause minors or
dependents to suffer materially. 38  Even in these cases, the issue is less
whether wealth might be increased by keeping someone alive than whether
particular children might suffer a loss (even if that loss would be offset by an
equal gain to someone else). The class of cases where wealth seems to come into
play are not the usual end-of-life situations, but blood transfusion cases. There
parents of minor children are sometimes denied the right to refuse transfusions
in life-threatening situations in small part because of financial concerns for
children. 39
Let's face it. As devastating as death is to the family of a terminally ill
patient, an earlier death typically saves money. Medical care is extraordinarily
expensive-currently about 13% of Gross National Product and growing. Yet
30% of Medicare funds are spent on the last year of life.1" One recent study
found that patients who were admitted with DNR orders incurred $10,631 in
hospital costs, while those who received DNR orders while in the hospital
incurred $73,055 in hospital costs.14'
Occasionally, commentators express concerns about the resources spent on
the elderly or terminally ill. Indeed, the British view embraces the rationing42
of care explicitly:
Resources provided to look after old people must necessarily be subtracted from
those available for other, still more important dependent group, the children, with
potentially disastrous results in underfunding of social support and education ...
Many old people do not wish for further longevity after they have become too
disabled to be of service to their families, and would prefer to see limited resources
being used for the young.
143
136. HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND
THE CARE OF THE DYING 119 (1987).
137. Id. at 120.
138. See, e.g., Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
139. See Karnezis, supra note 16, § 4 at 80.
140. Demanding Death With Dignity, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS 14 (Nov. 1991).
141. Alfred Maksoud et al., Do Not Resuscitate Orders and the Cost of Death, 153 ARCHIV. INTERN.
MED. 1249 (1993).
142. See, e.g., MARTIN A. STROSBERG, I. ALAN FEIN & JAMES D. CARROLL, RATIONING OF
MEDICAL CARE FOR THE CRITICALLY ILL (1989); RUTH MACKLIN, MORTAL CHOICES 149-64 (1987).
143. Bliss, supra note 26, at 117.
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Rationing has had less sympathetic treatment in the United States.1" Polls
suggest that many people (though not a majority) think that too much money is
spent on the terminally ill.
Table 43
People Divided on Whether Too Much is Spent on the Terminally Ml
As far as you know, thinking not about what you may spend personally but on
the total amount of money being spent on ... treating patients who are
terminally ill ... in the United States, would you say this amount is too high, too





BY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES FOR HARVARD COMMUNITY HEALTH PLAN
SOURCE: COMPARING HEALTH SYSTEMS, 1990
Table 54
Opposition to Expensive Life Support
Where a patient is very ill and his doctor says he has no hope of recovery, do
you think that patient's family should have the right to demand that he be kept
alive by a very expensive life-support system?
Yes, should have 33%
No, should not have 63
Not sure 4
BY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES FOR THE LORAN COMMISSION
SOURCE: MAKING DIFFICULT HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, 1987
It is interesting that in Table 54 people were opposed to the right of the family
to demand expensive life support. I would expect that, if the words "very
expensive" were omitted, people would be more willing to express support for
family rights. Nonetheless, a legal rule that made death easier to achieve would
save some of these funds.
And what does anyone get from the expenditure of these funds on the
comatose or semicomatose terminally ill? The terminally ill themselves don't
benefit from this money, because an overwhelming majority of people would not
want to be kept alive if they became terminally ill. Their pain is prolonged
against their probable wishes. Society generally doesn't benefit economically
144. Margaret P. Battin, Age Rationing and the Just Distribution of Health Care: Is There a Duty to
Die?, 97 ETHICS 317 (1987); Howard Eglit, Health Care Allocation for the Elderly: Age Discrimination
by Another Name?, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 813 (1989); 1 William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of
Current Cost-Containment Strategies, 257 JAMA 220 (1987); Lester Carl Thurow, Learning to Say "No,"
311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1569 (1984); Victor R. Fuchs, The "Rationing" of Medical Care, 311 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1572 (1984).
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because the unconscious terminally ill seldom recover enough to do valuable
work.
I'm not arguing that people have an obligation to commit suicide when they
can no longer do useful work. Indeed, the idea that one person must die when
society as a whole would economically benefit is a classic, if extreme, defect of
viewing wealth maximization as a surrogate for welfare maximization. My point
here is that honoring an unproductive person's wish to die would be wealth
maximizing. One medical text states the problem, albeit imprecisely in terms of
discrimination:
Assessments of quality of life are sometimes based on economic value to society,
social worth, or comparisons with other patients. Because the elderly have less
income, less economic productivity, and higher medical costs than other groups, such
considerations may lead to bias and discrimination against the elderly. Therefore,
such considerations are not appropriate in making bedside medical decisions. 45
If one had a rule that economically unproductive people must be killed-as
part of Hitler's euthanasia program terminally ill Germans and other "useless
eaters" were killed 1"-there would be substantial resources spent on avoidance.
Thus some of the gains that a Nazi planner could hope to achieve by killing the
unproductive would be dissipated by the extraordinary lengths that individuals
and their families would take to avoid the harshness of such a rule.
But in our case of desperate end-of-life situations, avoidance costs should not
be a significant problem. All that a person would have to do in order to avoid
a new default rule of death would be to leave a medical directive mandating that
heroic efforts be made to save one's life. The information cost of making an
advance directive is currently high enough that most people who want living wills
don't have them,147 but the costs are far from prohibitive. Anyone who feels
strongly may opt out of the default rule by making an advance directive
mandating aggressive treatment. They need not go into hiding from the
government.
In the end, wealth maximization would lead to a much broader use of
treatment withdrawals than our present default rule of life or my suggested
default rule of death. But it would allow too much. It would allow withdrawals
of treatment from anyone economically unproductive-whether they were
terminally ill or not, whether they would have probably preferred withdrawal or
not.
As I mentioned earlier, most economists believe that some rights are
economically wealth maximizing. This would complicate the analysis, but it
145. Bernard Lo, Quality of Life Judgments in the Care of the Elderly, in MEDICAL ETHICS, supra
note 7, at 141.
146. See RICHARD BREITMAN, THE ARCHITECT OF GENOCIDE: HIMMLER AND THE FINAL
SOLUTION 89-91 (1991).
147. Compare Table 68 in the Appendix with Gallup Poll, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY 56 (Jan. 1991)
(1990 poll) (80% don't have living wills; 75% of them want one).
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would push it closer to my analysis in the section on what people want. If you
actually had to buy out someone's life, in the case of an economically unproduc-
tive but otherwise quite happy retiree, no compensation is realistic. Your own
value on your life on the day of retirement is quite high, perhaps approaching
infinity. But as one lapses into semi-consciousness in a terminal illness, the value
becomes much less and may even be negative. You might even be happy to pay
someone to end your life.
Whether you would have to judge wealth-maximization by the ability to buy
out the person to die is unclear. If simply killing someone who was a serious
drain on resources would make the world richer, wouldn't that promote
economic efficiency? In his defense of economic efficiency against utilitarian-
ism,"4 Richard Posner argued that utilitarianism is subject to a criticism of
moral monstrousness for the idea that killing a bad person would make the world
better and increase general utility. But when Posner came to those people who
are unproductive, with his usual candor he seemed to slouch toward the same
morally offensive position:
A less welcome implication of the wealth-maximization approach is that people who
are very poor-not those who merely lack ready cash, but those who have insufficient
earning power to be able to cover the expenses of a minimum decent standard of
living-count only if they are part of the utility function of someone who has wealth.
... If he happens to be born feeble-minded and his net social product is negative,
he would have no right to the means of support though there was nothing
blameworthy in his inability to support himself This result grates on modem
sensibilities yet I see no escape from it that is consistent with any of the major ethical
systems.'49
Posner discussed the status of the unborn by asking "whether additional
population would be economically self-supporting.""15  This suggests that
society would be richer if unproductive people were dead. This problem has led
Posner more recently to embrace rights-based arguments as ultimate guides for
legal rules, perhaps relegating wealth maximization itself to a secondary principle
in extreme situations.'51 Yet even if Posner may have altered his normative
views on wealth maximization, his earlier comments are a revealing basis for
understanding how wealth maximization would treat the permanently unproduc-
tive.
I suppose that those who favor this form of efficiency would come up with
some sort of clever rights-based argument as to why respecting people's wishes
for life would increase the total pie even when the individuals are unproductive
and no individual would receive pleasure from paying for the total costs of care.
But I'll leave such an argument for others. If the rights of the unproductive can
indeed be squeezed into a wealth-maximizing principle, then the analysis should
148. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
149. Id. at 126.
150. Id.
151. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 376-80, 387 (1990).
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track my previous analysis of what people want. In other words, if it's
economically efficient to select a default rule that people want, then we should
look to polls and experience with advance directives.
Simple wealth maximization would seem to support a rule favoring death in
almost all situations involving the terminally ill. For my purposes, it suffices that
wealth-maximization efficiency analysis would support a decision rule favoring
withdrawals of treatment at least as broad as the one that I am advocating on
other principles. Because I don't equate wealth maximization with welfare
maximization, I need not endorse wealth-maximizing treatment withdrawals
beyond those that coincide with the probable wishes of the patient.
2. Penalty Default Rules Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner have argued that the
efficient default rule is sometimes the one that people would not have chosen.
Certainly, this is true. Indeed, in the last section I recognized the morally
monstrous argument that killing the unproductive might be economically
efficient. Certainly, it wouldn't be what people would intend for themselves.
But Ayres and Gertner are making a more genteel argument. They
introduce the idea of penalty defaults:
Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive
to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer. In contrast to the
perceived wisdom, penalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not
want-in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third
parties . 152
Although there are some significant differences between contracting and
patient wishes for treatment, 153 there are enough similarities to warrant my
examining whether the medical default rule is an efficient penalty rule. Ayres
and Gertner define penalty rules sufficiently broadly that any rule that works
against a party's desires becomes a penalty rule for that party. Thus any rule
that punishes contracting parties is a penalty rule, whether it's a good rule or a
bad rule, whether it's efficient or not.
There are several ways to apply Ayres and Gertner's analysis to end-of-life
decisions. I will briefly explore the four most likely approaches. First, if you
view the treatment contract between the doctor and the patient as arising while
the patient is incompetent, there can be no economic justification for punishing
the incompetent for not disclosing his treatment choices. Because he can't
contract around them at that late date, a contract should be implied on terms
that he would agree to if competent.
Second, one might consider Ayres and Gertner's rules for repeat players
(who are a type of expert). They argue that sometimes one party will be more
likely to be informed about the default rule and the contingencies that might
152. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 63, at 91.
153. Of course, medical treatment is typically provided under a contract. But in many cases, the
question is akin to whether there is a contract to treat or whether the quantity of treatment is specified.
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arise:
In some situations it is reasonable to expect one party to the contract to be
systematically informed about the default rule and the probability of the relevant
contingency arising. If one side is repeatedly in the relevant contractual setting while
the other side rarely is, it is a sensible presumption that the former is better informed
than the latter.1M
They contend that repeat players, such as real estate agents,55 should be
penalized by the default rule so as to give them the incentive to bargain about
contingencies that they can foresee. Doctors and hospitals, like real estate
agents, are repeat players with a much greater knowledge of the default rule and
the contingencies that might arise. This would suggest that, if anyone's preferred
default rule should be chosen, it should be the patient's, not the hospital's.
Third, one might view end-of-life situations as questions about the "quantity"
of medical care to be given-or perhaps about whether a contract for further
treatment exists between the patient and the doctor or hospital. Under this
characterization, Ayres and Gertner would apparently favor a penalty rule that
denied a contract altogether, returning the patient to the ex ante status of no
contract. 156 The problem with this status is that incompetent terminally ill
patients can no longer negotiate their own contracts and they usually need at
least painkillers. Thus we might want to imply a new contract for treatment; but
again that contract should be implied on terms that the now incompetent patient
would choose.
Fourth, one might view the default rule in end-of-life decisions as an
inefficient penalty default rule. We know that most people want living wills and
would prefer not to be kept alive if unconscious or dying with great pain.157
We also know that most people have not left advance directives15 8 and that
those who have left living wills may not have executed broad enough ones to
cover most of the relevant situations.159 What could be the economic reason
for this? The most likely explanation is that the information costs for patients
are so high that they outweigh the expected benefits. This should make the
penalty default rule inefficient under Ayres and Gertner's analysis.
There are two additional considerations that bear mentioning. Ayres and
Gertner are fuzzy about what they mean by efficiency, but it appears that for
them efficiency is wealth maximization. If so, then the odd problem of the
negative productivity of permanently dependent people might render irrelevant
what parties might agree to in a contract. In other words, this penalty rule
154. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 63, at 98.
155. Id. at 98-99.
156. Id. at 95-97.
157. See supra parts IV.A and IV.B.1.
158. See supra part IV.B.1.
159. See supra part IV.B.2.
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analysis may be beside the point if (as I argued in the previous section) most
contracts keeping the dependent alive would be economically inefficient.
In addition, Ayres and Gertner seem to dichotomize the choice of rules such
that one can't achieve the benefits of disclosure without punishing someone.
This isn't necessarily true. Especially where (as in health care) one party is not
usually trying to take advantage of the other, there may be ways to encourage
disclosure and planning without resorting to penalty rules in the event that the
parties don't plan. As in legal ethics, we need not combine mandatory and
aspirational standards. As I argued elsewhere regarding will formalities, there
are ways to encourage compliance without punishing those who don't com-
ply.1" In health care, the federal government, the states, and many hospitals
are doing just what I have recommended for wills. Under the Patient Self-
Determination Act,161 hospitals are required to discuss advance directives with
their patients. Even stronger hospital policies have the potential for closing the
gap without punishing those who didn't plan ahead. In some cases, we are
literally torturing patients because they didn't plan for incompetence. That gives
new meaning to the term penalty rule.
B. Utility, Happiness, or Welfare Maximization
Some economic theories are based on happiness, utility, or welfare
maximization.162 Although almost everyone agrees that there is more to
happiness than money, economists are split on the wisdom of opening up the
discipline to psychological and preference issues not usually cognizable in money.
Robert Ellickson, for example, argues that the wealth-maximizing model of
human behavior is not rich enough to explain the world.163 Richard Posner,
on the other hand, argues:
[I]t would be a mistake to abandon the economic model-the most fruitful in the
history of the social sciences-prematurely in favor of alternative models with an
inferior track record. Professor Ellickson doesn't want to abandon the economic
model but to improve it, but too many bells and whistles will stop the analytic engine
in its tracks.1"
The feature of welfare or utility analysis that makes it so difficult to use to
model human behavior is that (as almost all economic theorists agree)
160. James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C.L. REv. 541, 546-47,
569-72 (1990).
161. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, §§ 4206 & 4751, Pub. L. No. 101-508 (1990);
Hudson, supra note 115; McCloskey, supra note 115.
162. I am particularly indebted in this section to Gary Lawson's and Herbert Hovenkamp's
conflicting analyses of welfare maximization. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law &
Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REv. 993, 1031-58 (1990); Lawson, supra note 134.
163. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of
Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KE-NT L. REv. 23 (1989).
164. Richard A. Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson, 65 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 57 (1989).
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interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible."t How much pleasure one
receives from a particular activity is not measurable and may not even be
conceivable.1" As Lionel Rollins put it, "There is no means of testing the
magnitude of A's satisfaction as compared with B."167 These contentions lead
to three possible ways to analyze end-of-life decisions as welfare maximization.
1. The Skeptical Approach: No Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility. First,
one can take the approach of the most disciplined and skeptical economic
theorists, the ordinalists.'" Individuals may be able to rank order their own
preferences for themselves. Yet because there is no way to measure welfare or
to aggregate welfare on any sort of scale, one can't say that one approach or
another will promote aggregate welfare. Attempts to achieve either Pareto or
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency must of necessity fail, because there is no way to
aggregate the welfare of different people. Without a system that actually makes
everyone better off by buying off those who believe themselves made worse off
(so that their own happiness is increased by their own lights), no outcome can
be determined to be efficient as welfare maximization.
This analysis suggests the unreality of welfare maximization in practice. First,
no full compensation system is ever attempted. Second, all it takes is one fanatic
who values another rule high enough to thwart the efficiency of any rule.
2. The Modified Skeptical Approach: What Would a Person Prefer? The other
two approaches to welfare or utility maximization don't solve the problem raised
by the skeptical approach. Indeed, strictly speaking, they are not approaches
that ensure welfare maximization. Under the second approach, one could avoid
the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility by determining, not whether
one rule was preferable to another in total welfare, but instead whether a
randomly selected person would prefer one rule to another. For that hypotheti-
cal person, one rule would be preferable to another. This approach would not
tell us which rule maximized welfare, but (assuming adequate information) it
would tell us which approach would be preferred by most people. Under this
approach to welfare assessment, death should be the default rule in most end-of-
life situations, because (as directives and polls show) a randomly selected person
would be likely to prefer that default rule.
The usual theoretical problem with the approach I have just used is the
tyranny of the majority. Perhaps a randomly selected person would prefer to
enslave the poorest 5% of the population. Such a rule wouldn't seem to reflect
165. See Hovenkamp, supra note 162, at 1033-51; JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 59 (1976); Ian Shapiro, Richard Posner's Praxis, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 999, 1005 (1988); Gary
Lawson, supra note 134, at 12-20.
166. See Gary Lawson, supra note 134, at 60-64.
167. LORD ROLLINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 139-41
(2d ed. 1935).
168. Hovenkamp, supra note 162, at 1033-34; Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists
Wrong About Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LIT. 507 (1984). See Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption
Theory in Terms of Revealed Preferences, 15 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1948).
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total utility or happiness maximization because the utility loss to slaves might
outweigh the utility gains to the majority (and indeed there's no way to tell).
Yet under a slavery regime, the problem is that the costs of the rule are being
borne almost completely by persons who wouldn't choose that rule-the slaves.
Here, on the other hand, the person to die would choose the rule for himself, so
the tyranny of the majority problem is more theoretical than actual.
3. Rough Welfare Maximization. A third approach to welfare assessment is to
reject the consensus economic approach as a form of extreme philosophical
skepticism. Here we would assume that people think similarly and respond to
different situations similarly.169 Most people, for example, prefer a good job
to a single good meal and seem to direct more effort trying to get a good job.
Thus, even if one couldn't know absolutely what people would prefer or how
deeply the majority or the minority would feel about various legal rules, we
could observe what they say or do. In other words, we could adopt an external
standard for assessing preferences. 7 ' In 1927, Irving Fisher suggested that with
enough data we could get a rough sense of families' utility functions.17'
Because in end-of-life situations, the relevant people haven't expressed
preferences, we would have to assume they approach the world in much the
same way as those whose preferences we know.
This rough utilitarian approach would be vehemently opposed by most
economists because it directly challenges the skeptical approach that interperson-
al comparisons of utility are impossible. This rough approach would treat each
person as trying to maximize his own utility and as knowing what would make
him happy. People would tend to know whether keeping themselves alive would
be a good thing or not. And family members would know what would make
them happy. Then if one could combine the rough utilities for the family and
the patient together, one could assess what course of action was better. Thus,
one might be able to roughly maximize welfare under this approach by doing
whatever those most likely to have strong feelings would prefer in a particular
situation. But a full-fledged utility analysis would have to account for the gains
or losses to third parties beyond the family, chiefly medical personnel and the
general public.
In many of the actual cases, there is no knowledge by the unconscious patient
of what choice was made; thus, any gains to the patient's happiness or utility
must be in anticipation of having his wishes followed. The real gains and losses
in happiness would seem to me to come to the family-primarily emotionally, but
also materially to the extent that costs are saved. Where the family members
169. Hovenkamp, supra note 162, at 1050; Wesley C. Mitchell, Human Behavior and Economics: A
Survey of the Literature, 29 Q.J. ECON. 1, 7-8 (1914).
170. Hovenkamp, supra note 162, at 1051-56.
171. See Irving Fisher, A Statistical Method for Measuring "Marginal Utility" and Testing the Justice
of a Progressive Income Tax, in ECONOMIC ESSAYS CONTRIBUTED IN HONOR OF JOHN BATES CLARK
157 (J. Hollander ed., 1927).
[Vol. 56: No. 3
Page 185: Summer 1993]
agree to withdraw treatment, then a default rule doing the same might serve a
rough sense of welfare or utility maximization.
But where a patient would choose life, but a family would choose death (or
vice versa), even this rough, bastardized utility analysis breaks down. To the
extent that the patient is conscious when the choice is made, he may receive
pleasure if his presumptive wishes are followed. But his family would be made
unhappy. How does one weigh these relative concerns? If the patient is
unconscious, however, probably following the family's wishes would promote
welfare or utility.
4. Summary Under the skeptical approach currently accepted in welfare
economics, strict utility or welfare calculus is impossible. We can't aggregate
people's welfare in the way that we aggregate money because interpersonal
comparisons of utility are impossible. Under this skeptical approach, no default
rule is welfare maximizing. Under a more limited skeptical approach, the default
rule should be whatever a randomly selected person would be likely to do. Here
that would favor withdrawing treatment in the same situations as the "intent of
the patient" approach. Under the rough utilitarian approach in which
comparisons of utility are thought to be possible, however, where the family
agrees with a patient's probable wish for being allowed to die, the efficient rule
under utility maximization would be to allow death. But if the family favored
treatment when an unconscious patient probably wouldn't, then the comparison
becomes more difficult; perhaps the default rule under rough utility or welfare
maximization would be life in this limited situation.
VI
ERROR FUNCTIONS
One standard idea in law and economics that finds its way into noneconomic
discussions of end-of-life situations is an error function.'72 Justice Rehnquist
in the Cruzan majority opinion discusses this idea in the context of the standard
of proof:
We think it self-evident that the interests at stake in the instant proceedings are
more substantial, both on an individual and societal level, than those involved in a
run-of-the-mine civil dispute. But not only does the standard of proof reflect the
importance of a particular adjudication, it also serves as "a societal judgment about
how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants." The more
stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the more that party bears the risk
of an erroneous decision. We believe that Missouri may permissibly place an
172. See RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNS, AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO EVIDENCE:
TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 129-32 (1989); MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN
LAW 59-104 (1978); V.C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14
VAND. L. REV. 807 (1961); John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV.
1065 (1968); Richard Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977); Kate Stith, The Risk
of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U.
CHI L. REV. 1 (1990).
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increased risk of an erroneous decision on those seeking to terminate an incompetent
individual's life-sustaining treatment. An erroneous decision not to terminate results
in a maintenance of the status quo; the possibility of subsequent developments such
as advancements in medical science, the discovery of new evidence regarding the
patient's intent, changes in the law, or simply the unexpected death of the patient
despite the administration of life-sustaining treatment, at least create the potential
that a wrong decision will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An
erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible
of correction."'
Justice Brennan counters:
The majority claims that the allocation of the risk of error is justified because it is
more important not to terminate life-support for someone who would wish it
continued than to honor the wishes of someone who would not. An erroneous
decision to terminate life-support is irrevocable, says the majority, while an erroneous
decision not to terminate "results in a maintenance of the status quo." But, from the
point of view of the patient, an erroneous decision in either direction is irrevocable.
An erroneous decision to terminate artificial nutrition and hydration, to be sure, will
lead to failure of that last remnant of physiological life, the brain stem, and result in
complete brain death. An erroneous decision not to terminate life-support, however,
robs a patient of the very qualities protected by the right to avoid unwanted medical
treatment. His own degraded existence is perpetuated; his family's suffering is
protracted; the memory he leaves behind becomes more and more distorted.'74
Brennan goes on:
The majority's definition of the "status quo," of course, begs the question. Artificial
delivery of nutrition and hydration represents the "status quo" only if the State has
chosen to permit doctors and hospitals to keep a patient on life-support systems over
the protests of his family or guardian. The "status quo" absent that state interference
would be the natural result of his accident or illness (and the family's decision). The
majority's definition of status quo, however, is "to a large extent a predictable, yet
accidental confluence of technology, psyche, and inertia. The general citizenry ...
never said that it favored the creation of coma wards where permanently unconscious
patients would be tended for years and years. Nor did the populace as a whole
authorize the preeminence of doctors over families in making treatment decisions for
incompetent patients."'75
The idea behind an error function is that one should not look simply at the
likelihood of a false positive or a false negative, but at the cost or disutility of
each false outcome.176 When the cost of one type of error is much higher than
the other type of error, that should lower your willingness to run that risk.
But are the costs of a wrongful termination really worse than a wrongful
prolongation of life? First, an early termination should save money; prolonga-
173. Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990) (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 268 n.17 (citing Nancy Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REv. 375,
433-434 (1988)).
176. RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNS, AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT,
PROBLEMS, AND CASES 129-32 (1989); John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20
STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968).
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tion, on the other hand, should cost money. So other things being equal, the
economic cost of wrongful treatment is higher than wrongful withdrawal.
Second, the primary risks of wrongful death are an unwanted loss of life
(which may be sacred1" in a way that would prevent life-taking), a possibility
of misdiagnosis, a possibility of medical advances in treatment, and a possibility
that more might be found out about the patient's wishes for treatment. Yet all
of these risks are knowable to patients themselves. How to weigh these risks
against the risks on the other side-the expense, loss of dignity, loss of reputation
and affection, pain, suffering, family suffering, and other drawbacks of
treatment-is unknowable by anyone other than an individual. Doctors can
provide estimates of some risks, but how to put them together in a single
preference for or against treatment is something that only a patient can do. If
patients have put these risks together and expressed a preference, it should be
followed because the decision already reflects the error function. If when they
answer polls and write advance directives people choose death rather than life
in certain situations, then death should be the default rule because their
preference already incorporates the possibility of error. In other words, an error
function may be highly relevant to these decisions, but the only way to
incorporate it into the analysis is to look at the preferences of people who might
be aware of the risks of error.
VII
LETTING THE FAMILY DECIDE
The trend in the scholarly commentary is away from conclusions about the
right answer in end-of-life situations and toward a model that designates who
should choose. Behind the decision over who chooses is a practical advantage
in gap-filling and a sense that someone who understands the situation as it has
developed can make more intelligent choices. Further, some conceive the family
rather than the individual as the relevant decisionmaking unit.
My analysis might add two reasons to this list. First, as discussed above, the
surviving family has the biggest stake in the decision over a dying, unconscious
patient. Whatever pain or welfare will be enhanced by a particular decision will
be borne particularly by the family. Thus a welfare-maximizing economic
planner might get a rough sense of welfare by looking at the choices of family
members.
Second and more important, individuals prefer family involvement in the
decision to withhold treatment. Many of the polls showing support for the right
to withdraw treatment assume family involvement, and families more than other
groups are favored for making these treatment decisions. What makes things
ambiguous is that there is more support for the family and doctors deciding
177. "In the rush to acknowledge the quality of life, the sanctity of life must not be discarded." P.V.
Caralis, Withdrawal and Withholding of Life-Supporting Food and Fluids: One State's Struggle, 77 J. FLA.
MED. ASS'N 821 (1990).
. DEATHi By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
together than for the families alone. The courts and hospital administration are
little trusted.
Table 39
Preference for Family Decisions
If you were hospitalized in an unconscious state with a terminal illness, how
confident are you that your wishes about continuing or stopping life-sustaining
treatment would be followed by the [courts/doctors/family]? Are you very
confident, somewhat confident, not very confident, or not confident at all that
they would follow your wishes?
Courts Doctors Family
Very confident 7 % 26% 51%
Somewhat confident 28 31 31
Not very confident 21 15 8
Not confident at all 30 16 6
Don't know 14 11 5
BY: KRC COMMUNICATIONS/RESEARCH
SPONSOR: Kaiser Foundation
SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
Table 51
Preference for Family and Doctor Decisions
Let's take the case of a terminally ill patient who is unconscious and has not
made his or her wishes known in advance. Who, if anyone, do you think should
be allowed to make the decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment? Should
it be... the patient's family alone, or the patient's family and his or her doctors,
or the patient's doctors alone, or the hospital, or the courts, or should it be that
nobody should be allowed to make this decision?
Family alone 30%
Family and doctors 53
Patient's doctors alone 3
Hospital 0
Courts 3
Nobody should be allowed




SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
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Table 52
Preference for Family and Doctor Decisions
In the event that a terminally ill patient cannot decide for himself or herself, do
you think it would be best to leave the decision about ending the patient's life
to:...
The family and its doctor 80%
Laws passed by legislators 2
The courts 7
Not sure 11
BY: YANKELOVICH CLANCY SHULMAN
SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network
SOURCE: TIME/C.N.NJYANKELOVICH CLANCY SHULMAN, 1990
Because most patients want their families to decide when they can't, and
most choose family members as proxies, families should play the major role in
choosing the treatment for incompetent patients. But at least as strong as patient
preferences for family decisionmaking are patient preferences for death.
Families should be encouraged to choose what patients want. In end-of-life
situations, doctors should make families aware of probable patient preferences
for death.
VIII
CONCLUSION: WHEN THE DEFAULT RULE SWITCHES FROM LIFE TO DEATH
Anti-individualistic, the Fascist conception of life stresses the importance
of the State and accepts the individual only in so far as his interests
coincide with those of the State .... Liberalism denied the State in the
name of the individual; Fascism reasserts the rights of the State as
expressing the real essence of the individual.
- Benito Mussolini
178
Like the Fascist state advanced by Mussolini, the states of New York and
Missouri have put the rights of the state above the rights of the individual.
Other states and much of the medical profession also start with a default rule of
life in desperate end-of-life situations. Under the usual standards for default
rules in law and economics, life as the default rule here makes no sense.
Usually, a default rule is the one that the party would have chosen if she could
speak. In end-of-life situations it usually isn't. Or a default rule promotes
efficiency in the form of wealth maximization. Most assuredly, it doesn't here.
Or it promotes efficiency in the form of happiness, welfare, or general utility.
Either welfare analysis is theoretically impossible here or, if it isn't, a rough
178. BENITO MUSSOLINI, FASCISM: DOCTRINES AND INSTITUTIONS 10-11 (1935).
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utilitarian approach would lead to a default rule of death (at least where the
family agrees). Under all three ways of analyzing default rules, the current
default rule in Cruzan and O'Connor fails.
If the default rule for end-of-life situations should be death and the default
rule for normal medical situations should be life, where do you draw the line?
When should the default rule switch from life to death? The existing rule
favoring life at least has simplicity and consistency to commend it. But because
most cases eventually lead to decisions to withdraw treatment, the existing rule
is inconsistent in practice.
This line-drawing problem is enormously difficult, but it strangely adds little
in the way of theoretical complexity because the line I propose using is exactly
the same as the one that people want. The default rule should switch wherever
patient preferences switch. Thus, one must determine when most people would
prefer to have at least some treatments withdrawn. According to national public
opinion polls, it appears that there are at least eight such overlapping situations:
(1) patients on life support who have no hope of recovery;179
(2) patients in a coma with no brain activity being kept alive by a feeding
tube;18°
(3) patients who are terminally ill or in irreversible coma, supported by
life support systems, including food and water;"'
(4) patients with an illness that makes them totally dependent on a family
member or other person for all of their care (a situation in which they
would not want their doctors "to do everything possible to save" life);1 2
(5) patients with a disease with no hope of improvement suffering a great
deal of physical pain;'83
(6) patients in a coma with no hope of recovery but no pain;"u
(7) hopelessly ill or comatose patients on life support if their families
request the withdrawal of support; and
(8) permanently unconscious patients receiving food and water."
The study of medical directives and further polling of doctors, nursing home
residents, the elderly, and retirees reveals more situations in which at least some
treatments should be withheld:
(9) patients with a terminal illness which has progressed and caused their
heart to stop beating;187
179. See Table 1.
180. See Table 2.
181. See Table 3.
182. See Table 4 (subjects would not tell their doctors "to do everything possible to save" life). It
would not be wise to read this study as expressing a desire to withdraw all treatment, simply as a desire
to withdraw some treatments.
183. See Table 5.
184. See Table 6.
185. See supra part IV.A.1.
186. See supra part IV.A.1.
187. See Table 79.
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(10) mentally incompetent patients with a terminal illness which has
progressed and caused their heart to stop beating;"
(11) permanently unconscious patients in a persistent vegetative state
unable to eat normally, needing artificial feedings;8 9
(12) nursing home patients, no matter what the level of cognitive
functioning at time of treatment, needing resuscitation, amputation, or
tube feeding (either temporary or permanent);' 90
(13) nursing home residents about to die of natural causes needing drugs,
fluids, food by tubes, breathing machines, or heart massage; 91 and
(14) terminally ill retirees needing CPR, a respirator, a nasogastric
feeding tube, or intravenous fluids.1"
Among the only contrary situations are resuscitation and hospitalization for
AIDS patients. AIDS patients, however, seem to prefer not to be ventilated or
resuscitated if the disease has progressed to severe memory loss and severe
pneumonia. For other terminal illnesses, early treatments seem to be desired,
but more extreme treatments are increasingly not desired. 93
How one should use all this information about patient preferences will
depend on other views about decisionmaking for incompetent patients. Doctors
advising a family can explain that most patients would want treatment
withdrawn. This information might lessen anxiety and economic costs if the
family ultimately chooses what most families choose, to let the patient die.
Doctors can base their advice on the statistical preferences of patients, much as
they now base advice on the statistical prognosis for various conditions. Families
of patients in most end-of-life situations should be explicitly told, for example,
that 73-85% of the adult population would prefer to have treatment withdrawn
and that 86-93% of doctors would prefer no treatment for themselves. Because
eventually most patients are allowed to die, making families aware of the
preferences of most people should lessen anxiety and facilitate earlier resolution.
Families who wish to follow the patient's wishes will have guidance and support.
As stated earlier, where families and patients disagree, the analysis becomes
more complex. My analysis and the literature on patient preferences are
inconclusive. Patients both want death and want their families to decide.
Further, I am talking here about default rules, rules that may be varied by
expressed patient preferences. There rightly should be some concern about how
far doctors and families could legally go, even if patients wanted it. Thus, you
would want to ascertain whether you would withdraw life-preserving treatments
if you had excellent evidence that a patient, currently silent, wanted them
188. See Table 80.
189. See Table 81.
190. See supra part III. A. 1.
191. See Table 82-(68% of 75 nursing home residents in Pitt County, North Carolina, would not want
treatment).
192. See Table 83.
193. See id.; Marion Davis, A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for Life-Sustaining Care, 324
NEW ENG. J. MED. 882 (1991) (directives executed by 126 nursing home residents).
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withdrawn. If you are willing to go that far in stopping treatment and most
patients would want you to do it, then do it (unless you have evidence of a
contrary intent).
Medical care is supposed to be based on the informed consent of the patient.
Unconsented treatment is supposed to be a battery. Yet under the influence of
the O'Connor and Cruzan decisions, unconsented treatment has been made
legally acceptable in a few jurisdictions. Some courts seem to be confused about
what they're doing. They're willing to follow a patient's wishes when they're
"clear and convincing," but ignore them if they aren't. Perhaps that would make
sense if the default rule were set to reflect most people's wishes toward
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in desperate end-of-life situations. Then
we would be saying: Unless we have proof that this terminally ill patient is
different from other terminally ill patients, we will treat this patient as others
would like to be treated and withdraw life support. But with life as the default
rule, we are frustrating the intent of most patients subject to that rule.
Further, where does the state properly acquire the right to impose treatment
on patients? Hospitals may treat unconscious emergency victims because they
would want treatment; consent is implied. But a hospital or the state acts
improperly when it imposes treatment without express or implied consent.
Before doctors began to understand the etiology of disease in the late
1800s-when the chief medical treatments were bloodletting, cathartics, and
blistering-common law courts developed a workable system for initiating and
terminating treatment, the consent of the patient.194 Where it was difficult to
know whether treatments would do any good, the wishes of the patient
controlled. Ironically, the very proficiency of modern doctors and medical
equipment has put us back in a situation much like that before the mid-1800s.
Doctors can provide standard medical treatments to keep dying people alive, but
it's unclear whether these treatments do any real good. Perhaps, like blistering,
they do more harm than good. In this limbo, let patients decide. And where the
patient would have chosen death rather than life, the default rule should be
death.
194. Lori Andrews, Taking Care of the Doctor-Patient Relationship, AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 268-69
(1981).
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APPENDIX
SELECTED STUDIES AND NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION POLLS
ON WITHDRAWING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT*
I
TREATMENT PREFERENCES
Table 1. If you, yourself, were on life support systems and there was no hope
of recovering, would you like to remain on the life support system or would you
like treatment withheld so that you could end your life?
Treatment Withheld 84%
Kept on Life Support 9
No opinion 7
BY: GALLUP ORGANIZATION
SOURCE: GALLUP POLL, 1990
Table 2. Suppose you were in a coma with no brain activity and were being kept
alive by a feeding tube. Would you want your doctor to remove the feeding tube
and let you die, or not?
Want removal of feeding tube 85%
Would not want tube removed 11
Don't know/No answer 4
BY: CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES
SOURCE: CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES, 1990
Table 3. If you, yourself, were terminally ill or in irreversible coma, would you





SPONSOR: American Medical Association
SOURCE: HEALTH CARE ISSUES, 1990
* Sincere thanks are owed to the staff of the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut
for their kind assistance and for their database from which nearly all of the opinion polls were drawn.
Section IV, "Toward Euthanasia," represents only a small fraction of the available polls on that issue
and suicide. Poll questions asked of only a subgroup, such as those answering "yes" to another question,
were excluded from this compilation. Only national polls are included, except for the studies in the last
section.
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Table 4. How about if you had an illness that made you totally dependent on
a family member or other person for all of your care? (Repeat if necessary:
Would you tell your doctor to do everything possible to save your life, or would
you tell your doctor to stop treatment?)
Stop treatment 51%
Save life 31
It depends (volunteered) 7
Don't know 11
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1
SURVEY: 1990
Table 5. Now, I'm going to describe a few medical situations that sometimes
happen, and for each one, please tell me what you would want your own doctor
to do, if you could make the choice. If you had a disease with no hope of
improvement and you were suffering a great deal of physical pain, would you tell
your doctor to do everything possible to save your life, or would you tell your
doctor to stop treatment so you could die?
Stop treatment 59%
Save life 28
It depends (vol.) 6
Don't know 7
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
Table 6. Imagine you were in a coma with no hope of recovery, were suffering
no pain, and had left no instructions to your family or closest friend stating your
wishes. Would you want them to ask your doctor to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment, or would you not?
Yes, I would 75%
No, I would not 17




SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
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Table 7. How about if you had a disease with no hope of improvement that
made it hard for you to function in your day-to-day activities? (Repeat if
necessary: Would you tell your doctor to do everything possible to save your life,
or would you tell your doctor to stop treatment?)
Stop treatment 44%
Save life 40
It depends (volunteered) 8
Don't know 8
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: limes Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
Table 8. If you, yourself, were on life support systems and there was no hope
of recovering, would you like to remain on the life support system or would you




TOTAL: 9% 84% 7%
Age:
18-29 11 85 4
30-49 8 84 8
50 or older 9 82 9
Does getting older bother you?:
A great deal 17 70 14
Somewhat 9 87 5
Not at all 8 84 8
Fear of death:
Yes, fear death 11 83 6
No, don't fear death 8 84 8
Thinking about death:
Very often or somewhat often 7 85 8
Every now & again or
almost never 9 83 7
Religion:
Protestant 9 84 8
Catholic 8 85 7
Jew 9 91 0
None 10 80 11
Born-Again Christian:
Yes, born-again 9 84 7
No, not born-again 8 85 7
Church/Synagogue Member:
Yes, church/synagogue member 9 84 8
No, not c/s member 9 84 7
.. DEATH By DEFAULT





Attended church in last 7 days:
Yes, attended church 10 82 9
No, didn't attend church 8 85 6
Sex:
Male 11 82 7
Female 7 85 8
Education:
College Graduate 9 82 9
Some College 10 83 7
High-School Graduate 9 86 5
Less Than H-S Graduate 7 82 12
Education by Sex:
College Male 13 79 8
College Female 6 86 8
Noncollege Male 9 85 6
Noncollege Female 8 85 7
Race:
White 7 87 6
Black 19 64 17
Other 25 71 5
Region:
East 14 78 8
Midwest 7 87 6
South 8 83 10
West 6 88 7
Income:
$50,000 + 8 89 3
$30,000-49,900 10 86 5
$20,000-29,900 5 86 9
Under $20,000 11 83 7
Political Party:
Republican 9 84 7
Democratic 11 82 7
Independent 7 86 8
Ideology:
Liberal 8 86 6
Moderate 6 91 3
Conservative 9 84 7
BY: GALLUP ORGANIZATION
SOURCE: GALLUP POLL, 1990 (demographic data previously unpublished)
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Table 9. What do you think your.., father... would want his doctor to do in
these same situations? If he had a disease with no hope of improvement and
was suffering a great deal of physical pain, do you think he would want his own
doctor to do everything possible to save his life, or would he want the doctor to
stop treatment so he could die?
Save life 32%
Stop treatment 50
It depends (vol.) 2
Don't know 16
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
Table 10. What do you think your ... mother... would want her doctor to do
in these same situations? If she had a disease with no hope of improvement and
was suffering a great deal of physical pain, do you think she would want her own
doctor to do everything possible to save her life, or would she want the doctor
to stop treatment so she could die?
Save life 31%
Stop treatment 54
It depends (vol.) 2
Don't know 13
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
Table 11. What if you had an illness with no hope of recovery and were
suffering a great deal of physical pain. Do you think you would consider
alternatives that would end your life, or would you probably not?
Yes, I would 52%
No, I would not 36




SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
Table 12. How about if... your father.., had an illness that made him totally
dependent on a family member or other person for all of his care? (Repeat if
necessary: Do you think he would want his own doctor to do everything possible
to save his life, or would he want the doctor to stop treatment? )
Save life 32%
Stop treatment 48
It depends (vol.) 2
Don't know 18
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Table 13. How about if ... your mother ... had an illness that made her
totally dependent on a family member or other person for all of her care?
(Repeat if necessary: Do you think she would want her own doctor to do




It depends (vol.) 2
Don't know 16
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECI'IONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
Table 14. How about if ... your father ... had a disease with no hope of
improvement that made it hard to function in day-to-day activities? (Repeat if
necessary: Do you think he would want his own doctor to do everything possible
to save his life, or would he want the doctor to stop treatment? )
Save life 38%
Stop treatment 42
It depends (vol.) 2
Don't know 18
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
Table 15. How about if... your mother ... had a disease with no hope of
improvement that made it hard to function in day-to-day activities? (Repeat if
necessary: Do you think she would want her own doctor to do everything
possible to save her life, or would she want the doctor to stop treatment? )
Save life 39%
Stop treatment 43
It depends (vol.) 2
Don't know 16
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
[Vol. 56: No. 3
Page 185: Summer 1993]
II
FOLLOWING THE PATIENT'S TREATMENT CHOICE AND THE RIGHT To DIE
Table 16. The New Jersey Supreme Court recently ruled that all life-sustaining
medical treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from terminally ill patients,
provided that is what the patients want or would want if they were able to






SOURCE: GALLUP REPORT, 1985
Table 17. In 1985, the State Supreme Court in New Jersey ruled that life-
sustaining medical treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from terminally ill
patients, provided that is what the patients want or would want if they were able






BY: LOS ANGELES TIMES
SOURCE: LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1989
Table 18. Would you favor or oppose withdrawing life support systems,
including food and water, from hopelessly ill or irreversibly comatose patients if




Not sure 11 12
BY: KANE, PARSONS AND ASSOCIATES (1986); GALLUP ORGANIZATION (1990)
SPONSOR: American Medical Association
SOURCE: HEALTH CARE ISSUES, 1990,1986
Table 19. Do you think doctors should be allowed to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment for a terminally ill patient who is... unconscious but has left written




BY: YANKELOVICH CLANCY SHULMAN
SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network
SOURCE: TIME/C. N. N. /YANKELOVICH CLANCY SHULMAN, 1990
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Table 20. Do you think doctors should be allowed to withdraw life-sustaining




BY: YANKELOVICH CLANCY SHULMAN
SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network
SOURCE: TIME/C. N. N. /YANKELOVICH CLANCY SHULMAN, 1990
Table 21. Recently there have been newspaper and television stories about the
terminally ill and their right to have life-support systems disconnected. In your
opinion, does a terminally ill person and/or one who is permanently bedridden
and kept alive by medical machinery have the right to request to be allowed to
die?
Absolutely yes, without question 58%
Yes, but only if medical opinions agree
that the case is hopeless 22
Yes, but only if medical expenses are
burdening the family 2
Yes, if tax dollars are being spent to
keep the patient alive 1
No, because it is religiously and
ethically wrong 3
No, because where there is life there
is hope 4
Positively no, without exception 2
Don't know 5
No answer 2
BY: RESEARCH AND FORECASTS
SPONSOR: American Board of Family Practice
SOURCE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: HEALTHCARE OPINIONS, 1984
Table 22. In some states, it's legal to stop medical treatment that is keeping a
terminally ill patient alive, or never start the treatment in the first place, if that's
what the patient wants. Do you approve or disapprove of laws that let patients
decide about being kept alive through medical treatment?
Approve 79%
Disapprove 13
It depends (vol.) 5
Don't know 3
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
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Table 23. Do you think that the law should allow doctors to honor the written
instructions of their patients, even if it means allowing them to die?
Yes, should allow 68%
No, should not allow 20
Not sure 11
BY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: The President's Commission for The Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Researd.
SOURCE: MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, 1982
Table 24. Which comes closer to your view? In all circumstances, doctors and
nurses should do everything possible to save the life of a patient. Or, sometimes
there are circumstances where a patient should be allowed to die.
Always save a life 15%
Sometimes let a patient die 73
It depends (vol.) 7
Don't know 5
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
Table 25. Because of advances in medical technology, doctors are now able to
keep people alive who otherwise might die. If patients ask doctors to stop
keeping them alive, do you think doctors should do this, even if this means the
patient will die, or do you think doctors should not do this?
Doctors should do 73%
Doctors should not do 19
Not sure 8
BY: NBC NEWS/WALL STREET JOURNAL
SOURCE: NBC NEWSWALL STREET JOURNAL, 1988
Table 26. All doctors take an oath saying they will maintain, restore and
prolong human life in their treatment of patients. It is now argued by some
people that in many cases people with terminal diseases (those which can only
end in death) have their lives prolonged unnecessarily, making them endure
much pain and suffering for no real reason. Do you think a patient with a
terminal disease ought to be able to tell his doctor to let him die rather than to
extend his life when no cure is in sight, or do you think this is wrong?
1981 1977 1973
Let die 78% 71% 62%
Wrong 19 18 28
Not sure 3 11 10
BY: LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCIATES
SOURCE: HARRIS SURVEY, 1981, 1973
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Table 27. Generally speaking, do you agree or disagree with the following
statement: "Life sustaining medical treatment should be withheld or withdrawn
from terminally-ill patients, provided that is what the patients want, or what the
family wants if the patients are not able to express their wishes. " (If agree or







BY: LOS ANGELES TIMES
SOURCE: LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1989
Table 28. Let's take the case of a terminally ill person who is conscious and
suffering a great deal of pain. If this person requests that his or her doctors
withhold life-sustaining treatment, do you think the doctors should be required
to do so, or allowed but not required to do so, or prohibited from withholding
life-sustaining treatment?
Required to withhold 34%
Allowed to withhold but not required 46





SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
Table 29. Let's take the case of a terminally ill patient who is unconscious and
has left written instructions in a living will calling for doctors to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment in this situation. Do you think the patient's doctors should
be required to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, or allowed to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment without being required to do so, or prohibited from
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment?
Required to withdraw 41%
Allowed to withdraw but not required 46
Prohibited from withdrawing 6




SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
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Table 30. Do you believe that your stated wishes (in your "living will") will be
followed if the situation arises (concerning the use of life-sustaining treatment if





SPONSOR: American Medical Association
SOURCE: HEALTH CARE ISSUES, 1988
Table 31. Suppose a terminally ill person wants treatment withheld so that he
or she may die. Please tell me whether or not you agree with each of the
following statements. The patient has the right to stop treatment (ROTATED):
Yes No
If the doctor agrees: 75% 22%
If he or she is in great pain: 78 18
If his or her family agrees: 76 22
Under any circumstances: 59 38
Under no circumstances: 11 87
BY: GALLUP ORGANIZATION
SOURCE: GALLUP POLL, 1990
Table 32. Would you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose
withdrawing life support systems including food and water from hopelessly ill or








SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
Table 33. Do you think that the law should allow doctors to honor the written
instructions of their patients, who are very ill with no hope of recovery, even if
it means allowing them to die?
Yes, should allow 84%
No, should not allow 13
Not sure 3
BY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: The Loran Commission
SOURCE: MAKING DIFFICULT HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, 1987
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Table 34. Do you favor or oppose the following?... A terminally ill patient's
right to stop his/her own treatment
Favor 79%
Oppose 14
Don't know/No answer 7
BY: RESEARCH AND FORECASTS
SPONSOR: The Hearst Corporation
SOURCE: KNOWLEDGE OF HEALTH AND PHYSICAL WELL-BEING, 1985
Table 35. Assuming that a patient is judged mentally capable of understanding
the terminal or permanent nature of his condition, if that patient's request to be
allowed to die is denied by anybody, do you think...
The doctor should support the patient's
request to die 31
The patient's civil rights are being denied
if his request to die is not acted on 32
The hospital administrators should have no
say in the matter 6
The court should be the final judge about
a patient's request to die 7
The patient should never be allowed the
choice to die 7
The hospital administrators should alone
make the decision 1
Don't know 10
No answer 5
BY: RESEARCH AND FORECASTS
SPONSOR: American Board of Family Practice
SOURCE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: HEALTHCARE OPINIONS, 1984
Table 36. Which of the following people do you think has the right and the
responsibility to honor a terminally ill patient's request to be allowed to die?
The patient and family 54%
The patient and the doctor 37
The patient alone 39
Only the family and family doctor 21
Only complete agreement of the patients,
the patient's doctor, the patient's family,
the hospital medical staff, and the patient's
religious leader 17
The family doctor and hospital medical staff 15
The hospital medical staff 7
The patient's religious leader 7
Don't know 2
BY: RESEARCH AND FORECASTS
SOURCE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: HEALTHCARE OPINIONS, 1984
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Table 37. Generally speaking, do you agree or disagree with the following
statement: Life-sustaining medical treatment should be withheld or withdrawn
from terminally-ill patients, provided that is what the patients want, or what the
family wants if the patients are not able to express their wishes? (If agree or







BY: LOS ANGELES TIMES
SOURCE: LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1990
Table 38. Assume that the cancer has spread throughout the body. It is very
likely that you will die regardless of what you do. There is a decision between
aggressive therapy-which will probably make you feel sick and will probably not
help your condition-and supportive therapy-which will not help your
condition, but will allow you to be comfortable. Who do you think should make
the decision between these two therapies-the doctor or you?
Doctor should make the decision 12%
I should make the decision 79
Should be joint decision (vol.) 8
Not sure 1
BY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: The President's Commission for The Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.
SOURCE: MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, 1982
Table 39. If you were hospitalized in an unconscious state with a terminal
illness, how confident are you that your wishes about continuing or stopping life-
sustaining treatment would be followed by the [courts/doctors/family]? Are you
very confident, somewhat confident, not very confident, or not confident at all
that they would follow your wishes?
Courts Doctors Family
Very confident 7 % 26% 51%
Somewhat confident 28 31 31
Not very confident 21 15 8
Not confident at all 30 16 6
Don't know 14 11 5
BY: KRC COMMUNICATIONS/RESEARCH
SPONSOR: Kaiser Foundation
SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Table 40. How much attention do you think doctors and nurses pay to
instructions from patients about whether or not they want treatment to keep
them alive? Do you think doctors and nurses pay a lot of attention, some
attention, or very little attention to patients' instructions?
A lot of attention 20%
Some attention 37
Very little attention 26
No attention at all (vol. ) 2
Don't know 15
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
Table 41. (I am going to read some statements to you about current issues.
Please indicate if you strongly agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, or strongly
disagree. ) ... A terminally ill person should have the right to refuse life
prolonging medical treatment.
1987 1986 1984
Strongly agree 78% 75% 77%
Slightly agree 16 17 15
Slightly disagree 2 4 2
Strongly disagree 2 2 4
No opinion/Not sure 1 3 2
BY: MARK CLEMENTS RESEARCH
SPONSOR: Glamour Magazine
SOURCE: WOMEN'S ATTITUDES, 1987, 1986, 1984
SURVEY POPULATION: Women aged 18-65
Table 42. (Now let me ask you about a number of issues here at home. For
each, tell me if you favor or oppose it. )... A new law that would allow doctors





BY. LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: The Democratic Governors Association and Democrats for the 80's.
SOURCE: KEY ISSUES IN THE COUNTRY IN 1987,1987
Table 43. As far as you know, thinking not about what you may spend
personally but on the total amount of money being spent on... treating patients
who are terminally ill... in the United States, would you say this amount is too





BY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Harvard Community Health Plan
SOURCE: COMPARING HEALTH SYSTEMS, 1990
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III
TREATMENT WITH THE AGREEMENT OF OTHERS
Table 44. Suppose a patient is in a coma, doctors say brain activity has stopped
and the patient is getting food and water through a feeding tube. Should a close
family member have the right to tell the doctor to take away the feeding tube
and let the person die, or not?
Allow feed tube removal 81%
Not allow 13
Don't know/No answer 6
BY: CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES
SOURCE: CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES, 1990
Table 45. If a person has an incurable disease and is very ill and unable to give
his consent to have his life ended, do you think that a doctor should or should






SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
Table 46. In cases in which a coma patient is being kept alive only by a
machine that supplies water and liquid food, do you think that the law should...
Require that the machine continue operating
until the patient dies or recovers 7%
Allow the machine to be turned off only if the
patient previously stated such a preference 26
Allow the family members to make the decision
to turn off the machine 51
Allow doctors to make the decision to turn
off the machine 9
Don't know 7
Refused 1
BY: I.C.R. SURVEY RESEARCH GROUP
SPONSOR: Maturity News Service
SOURCE: RIGHT TO DIE EXCEL STUDY, 1990
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Table 47. If a patient with a terminal disease is unable to communicate and has
not made his or her own wishes known in advance, should the closest family
member be allowed to decide whether to continue medical treatment, or should
a family member not be allowed to make this decision?
Allowed 71%
Not allowed 16
It depends (vol.) 5
Don't know 8
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
Table 48. There have been cases where a patient is terminally ill, in a coma and
not conscious, with no cure in sight. Do you think that the family of such a
patient ought to be able to tell doctors to remove all life support services and let
the patient die, or do you think this is wrong?
Ought to be allowed 66%
Think is wrong 19
Not sure 15
BY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES
SOURCE: HARRIS SURVEY, 1977
Table 49. Do you think a family member should or should not be able to make
the decision to terminate life support systems on a terminally ill patient who is
in a coma?
Should be able to decide 68%
Should not be able to decide 15
Depends on circumstances (vol.) 13
Not sure 4
BY: HART AND TEETER RESEARCH COMPANIES
SPONSOR: NBC NEWS/WALL STREET JOURNAL
SOURCE: NBC NEWSWALL STREET JOURNAL, 1990
Table 50. There have been cases where a patient is terminally ill, in a coma and
not conscious, with no cure in sight. Do you think that the family of such a
patient ought to be able to tell doctors to remove all life-support services and let




BY: LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCIATES
SOURCE: HARRIS SURVEY, 1981
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Table 51. Let's take the case of a terminally ill patient who is unconscious and
has not made his or her wishes known in advance. Who, if anyone, do you think
should be allowed to make the decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment?
Should it be ... the patient's family alone, or the patient's family and his or her
doctors, or the patient's doctors alone, or the hospital, or the courts, or should
it be that nobody should be allowed to make this decision?
Family alone 30%
Family and doctors 53
Patient's doctors alone 3
Hospital 0
Courts 3
Nobody should be allowed




SOURCE: NATIONAL ATIITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
Table 52. In the event that a terminally ill patient cannot decide for himself or
herself, do you think it would be best to leave the decision about ending the
patient's life to:...
The family and its doctor 80%
Laws passed by legislators 2
The courts 7
Not sure 11
BY: YANKELOVICH CLANCY SHULMAN
SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network
SOURCE: TIME/C.N.N./YANKELOVICH CLANCY SHULMAN, 1990
Table 53. (Do you favor or oppose the following? )... The right of next of kin
to stop treatment of a terminally ill patient.
Favor 63%
Oppose 26
Don't know/No answer 11
BY: RESEARCH AND FORECASTS
SPONSOR: The Hearst Corporation
SOURCE: KNOWLEDGE OF HEALTH AND PHYSICAL WELL-BEING, 1985
Table 54. Do you agree or disagree... there is a sacred duty to preserve life as




BY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: The Loran Commission
SOURCE: MAKING DIFFICULT HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, 1987
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Table 55. Where a patient is very ill and his doctor says he has no hope of
recovery, do you think that patient's family should have the right to demand that
he be kept alive by a very expensive life-support system?
Yes, should have 33%
No, should not have 63
Not sure 4
BY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: The Loran Commission
SOURCE: MAKING DIFFICULT HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, 1987
Table 56. Do you think doctors should be allowed to withdraw life-sustaining





BY: YANKELOVICH CLANCY SHULMAN
SPONSOR: Time, Cable News Network
SOURCE: TIME/CN.NJYANKELOVICH CLANCY SHULMAN, 1990
IV
TOWARD EUTHANASIA
Table 57. When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think
doctors should be allowed by law to end the patient's life by some painless
means if the patient and his family request it?
1991 1990 1989 1988 1986 1985 1983 1982 1978 1977 1973 1947
Yes 70 69 66 66 66 64 63 61 58 60 53 37
No 25 26 30 29 31 33 33 34 38 36 40 54
Don't know 5 5 4 5 4 3 4 5 4 4 7 9
BY: NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER (1977-91); GALLUP ORGANIZATION (1947-73)
SOURCE: GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY (1977-91); GALLUP POLL (1947-73)
Table 58. Do you think that the law should allow doctors to comply with the
wishes of a dying patient in severe distress who asks to have his life ended?
Should allow 53%
Should not allow 38
Not sure 8
No answer/Refused 2
BY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: The President's Commission for The Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.
SOURCE: MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, 1982
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Table 59. Do you think the patient who is terminally ill, with no cure in sight,
ought to have the right to tell his doctor to put him out of his misery, or do you
think this is wrong?
Ought to be allowed 49%
Think this is wrong 38
Not sure 13
BY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES
SOURCE: HARRIS SURVEY, 1977
Table 60. If someone has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think there
should be a law allowing doctors to end the patient's life by some painless way
if the patient and his family request it, or don't you think so?
Yes, should be a law 63%
No, should not be a law 30
Not sure 7
BY: NBC NEWS/WALL STREET JOURNAL
SOURCE: NBC NEWS/WALL STREET JOURNAL, 1988
Table 61. Do you think a person has the right to end his or her own life if this
person .. has an incurable disease?
1991 1990 1989 1988 1986 1985 1982 1978 1977
Yes 57% 56% 47% 50% 52% 44% 45% 38% 38
No 40 38 49 46 45 53 50 58 59
Don't know 3 6 5 4 3 3 5 3 3
BY: NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER
SOURCE: GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY 1991, 1990, 1989, 1988, 1986, 1985, 1982, 1978, 1977
Table 62. Do you think a person has the moral right to end his or her life under





SOURCE: GALLUP POLL, 1990
Table 63. Do you think a person has the moral right to end his or her life under






SOURCE: GALLUP POLL, 1990
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Table 64. There is a ballot question in the November election in Washington
state which would make it legal for doctors to assist a patient who wishes to die
if at least two physicians have diagnosed the patient as terminally ill, with six
months or less to live. Doctors would be legally permitted to give a lethal
injection or provide a patient with a lethal dose of drugs. In addition, state law
would specify that individuals can request in advance that food and water be
withheld in the event they are hopelessly ill or injured. If this question were to








SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
Table 65. Do you think that the law should allow doctors to comply with the
wishes of a dying patient in severe distress who asks to have his life ended?
Yes, should allow 62%
No, should not allow 34
Not sure 4
BY: LOUIS HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: The Loran Commission
SOURCE: MAKING DIFFICULT HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, 1987
V
LIVING WILLS
Table 66. Do you personally have a written living will that states what should
be done in case you have a terminal illness or injury, with no hope of recovery?
Yes 17%
No 83
No Opinion/Don't Know 0
BY: ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST
SOURCE: ABC NEWS/WASHINGTON POST, 1991





SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
[Vol. 56: No. 3
Page 185: Summer 1993]
Table 68. Do you, yourself, have a written "living will" which states what should






SOURCE: GALLUP POLL, 1990




BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #, 1990
Table 70. Have you filled out what is known as a "living will" stating those
wishes (concerning the use of life-sustaining treatment if you ever enter a coma





SPONSOR: American Medical Association
SOURCE: HEALTH CARE ISSUES, 1988




BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Times Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
Table 72. Are you at all familiar with the concept of a living will, in which a
person leaves written instructions detailing his or her wishes on the use of life-







SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Table 73. Starting on December first (1991), the federal government will require
all hospitals to tell patients they have the right to make a living will or to
designate someone to make medical decisions for them if they cannot. Do you







SOURCE: NATIONAL ATITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
Table 74. Do you think the (federal) law (which requires all hospitals to tell
patients they have the right to make a living will or designate someone to make
medical decisions for them if they cannot) should allow doctors to honor the






SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
Table 75. Have you told your family or closest friend what your wishes would
be concerning life-sustaining treatment if you ever enter a coma from which






SOURCE: NATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH AND TERMINAL ILLNESS, 1991
Table 76. Have you told your family what your wishes would be concerning the
use of life-sustaining treatment, if you ever enter a coma from which doctors do





SPONSOR: American Medical Association
SOURCE: HEALTH CARE ISSUES, 1988
[Vol. 56: No. 3
Page 185: Summer 1993]
Table 77. With whom, if anyone, have you discussed your wishes for (stopping
or continuing) your own medical treatment in these kinds of (certain) circum-









BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Tunes Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1 , 1990
Table 78. Are your own wishes for (stopping or continuing) medical treatment
(in certain circumstances) written down somewhere?
Yes 13%
No 87
BY: PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
SPONSOR: Tunes Mirror
SOURCE: REFLECTIONS OF THE TIMES #1, 1990
VI
SELECTED STUDIES
Table 79. Assume that you developed a terminal illness which has progressed
and caused your heart to stop beating. Given these circumstances, you would
want CPR. [Asked of physicians.]
Strongly Agree, Agree,
or No Strong Feelings 14%
Strongly Disagree or Disagree 86
SOURCE: BRUNETTI, CARPEROS & WESTLUND STUDY, 1989
Table 80. Assume that you are mentally incompetent suffering from a terminal
illness which has caused your heart to stop beating. Given these circumstances,
you would want CPR. [Asked of physicians.]
Strongly Agree, Agree,
or No Strong Feelings 7%
Strongly Disagree or Disagree 93
SOURCE: BRUNETTI, CARPEROS & WESTLUND STUDY, 1989
DEATH By DEFAULT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Table 81. If you became permanently unconscious in a persistent vegetative
state and could not eat normally, you would want your life maintained through
artificial feedings. [Asked of physicians.]
Strongly Agree, Agree,
or No Strong Feelings 8%
Strongly Disagree or Disagree 92
SOURCE: BRUNETTI, CARPEROS & WESTLUND STUDY, 1989
Table 82. If you were about to die of natural causes, would you want us to keep
you alive by drugs, fluids, food by tubes, breathing machines, and heart massage?




SOURCE: DIAMOND, JERNIGAN, MOSELEY, MESSINA, & MCKEOWN STUDY, 1989
Table 83. [Preference for following treatments if terminally ill.]
Yes Undecided or Qualified No
Want CPR 0% 22.2% 77.8%
Want respirator 0 7.9 92.1
Want nasogastric tube
feeding 1.6 9.5 88.9
Want intravenous fluids 6.3 19.1 74.6
Want oxygen for comfort 65.1 14.3 20.6
Want antibiotic therapy 23.8 34.9 41.3
SOURCE: HENDERSON STUDY, 1990
[Vol. 56: No. 3
